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ABSTRACT

In recent years, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) have become key
actors promoting economic development. Despite their rapid rise, there are still
significant gaps in the development sphere regarding what NGOs do in specific contexts.
This research evaluates how NGOs promote economic development among Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon to give context to general trends within development literature.
Through an in-depth case study of the NGO Cives Mundi and their recent development
project Tatreez–focused on promoting economic empowerment among Palestinian
refugee women through the formation of a weaving co-op–this study seeks to evaluate
key advantages and disadvantages to NGO work in specific contexts to explain the
variation in NGO strategies for promoting economic development. Through analyzing the
reaction and adaptation of the NGO Cives Mundi to the changing environment within
their areas of intervention, this research will analyze how NGOs react to their
environment and how their experience fits in with generalizations made within existing
development frameworks.

Keywords: Economic Development, NGOs, International Relations, Foreign Aid,
Empowerment, Participation
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In what is largely seen as a new era of bottom up growth, many analysts
characterize NGOs as the “magic bullets,” or rather the most effective and efficient
actors, for solving development issues.1 In response to these shifts in development
priorities, NGOs are leading what is termed a “quiet revolution” in international
development.2 This revolution—revealed through their rapid growth in number, size, and
scope—points to the importance of their role in international development;3 what lacks
clarity is the nature of these roles and how they function in practice. This study seeks to
contextualize and evaluate general trends in the development sphere regarding the roles
of NGOs in promoting economic development in order to assess how NGOs promote
economic development in particular contexts. Through an analysis of key advantages and
barriers to NGO functions in these roles, this study will investigate why NGOs pursue
particular strategies and explore how these strategies change in response to shifting

1

Michael Edwards & David Hulme. Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance
and Accountability in the Post Cold-War World (London: Earthscan and West Hartford:
Kumarian Press, 1995), 3.
2
Eric Werker & Faisal Z. Ahmed. “What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?”
Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 2 (Spring 2008): 74; Lester M. Salamon. “The Global
Associational Revolution: The Rise of Third Sector on the World Scene.” Institute for Policy
Study, Johns Hopkins University (Baltimore, 1993), 1, quoted in William F. Fisher. “Doing Good?
The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices.” Annual Review of Anthropology 26 (1997): 440.
3
David Lewis & Nazneen Kanji, NGOs and Development (New York and Abington:
Routledge, 2009). 14.
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environments. This study will take an in-depth look at the NGO sector in Lebanon,
specifically focusing on the operations of the NGO Cives Mundi and their initiatives to
promote economic development among Palestinian refugees. More specifically, this
research will evaluate their response to the changing contexts within their areas of
intervention as they work within Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Through a
detailed analysis of this case and a comparison with the general findings regarding
development initiatives within Lebanon, this study will give insight into how NGOs
promote economic development in practice and why they employ the strategies they do.
NGOs themselves are an extremely diverse group of organizations. They vary in
function, size, structure, and goals, and operate in diverse contexts. For this study, NGOs
are defined as: “private organizations that are self-governing and not-for-profit that
pursue humanitarian rather than commercial objectives" whose activities claim to
“relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide
basic social services, or undertake community development.” Within this definition,
NGOs can be segmented further based upon geography: Northern vs. Southern NGOs,
where Northern NGOs originate from developed countries and Southern NGOs from
developing countries, and also by function4: advocacy vs. service provision (note: many
NGOs engage in both). This study will focus on Northern NGOs operating in Global
South, specifically to promote economic development through both advocacy and service
provision.

Werker & Ahmed, “What Do Nongovernmental Organizations Do?” 74; The World
Bank, “Working with NGOs: A Practical Guide to Operational Collaboration Between the World
Bank and Non-governmental Organizations,” Operations Policy Department, Washington D.C.,
1995.
4
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What constitutes “economic development” also varies broadly in definition and is
commonly, albeit inaccurately, used synonymously with economic growth. This study
differentiates between economic growth, measured as an increase in aggregate economic
output, and economic development, defined as “activities that expand capacities to realize
the potential of individuals, firms or communities who contribute to the advancement of
society through the responsible production of goods and services.”5 Based upon this
definition, economic development should result in greater prosperity and higher quality
of life for individuals.6 In his international work, Amartya Sen identifies economic
development as the support of freedom and autonomy, which allows for increased
economic participation and social mobility to permit individuals to develop the capacities
to engage, contribute, and benefit from the economy.7 These outcomes require effective
institutions “grounded in norms of openness, tolerance for risk, appreciation for diversity,
and confidence in the realization of mutual gain for the public and the private sector.”8
This study will focus on evaluating the roles of NGOs in promoting this definition of
economic development. Existing development analysis recognizes the diversity of NGO
roles in economic development as they shift within different contexts.9
In the following section, I provide a literature review analyzing the what was been
said in development literature regarding NGOs and their roles in economic development.
Following the literature review, I will apply the conventional wisdom regarding NGOs

5

Maryann Feldman, Theodora Hadjimichael, Tom Kemeny & Lauren Lanahan.
“Economic Development: A Definition and Model for Investment.” Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy (2014): 20.
6
Ibid., 21.
7
Amartya Sen. Commodities and Capabilities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999),
quoted in Ibid., 4-5.
8
Ibid., 12.
9
Ibid., 2.
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and economic development to a secondary study where I evaluate NGOs working to
promote economic development among Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon. I will
utilize my more general findings from this secondary analysis to do an in-depth case
study of the NGO Cives Mundi and their development project Tatreez—which aims to
economically empower Palestinian refugee women living within refugee camps in
Lebanon. This study will identify and evaluate advantages and disadvantages to NGO
work in this context and analyze the reaction and adaptation of the NGO Cives Mundi to
their environment.
While the following literature review analyses the conventional wisdom regarding
NGOs and their roles in promoting economic development, this wisdom also asserts that
generalizing about the NGO sector is inherently problematic. Development analysts
argue that it is necessary to consider the "changing local, regional, national, and
international processes and connections which both potentially support or suppress NGO
work."10 The following literature review does evaluate generalizations regarding NGOs
and their roles in economic development, however these theoretical limitations must be
taken into consideration.

10

Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 449.
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CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Within development studies, there is a distinct divide between critics regarding
the roles of NGOs in promoting economic development. Mohan and Stokke identify
these viewpoints as being the ‘new left’ and the ‘new right’ or ‘revisionist neo-liberalism’
and ‘post-Marxism.’11 Arturo Escobar makes the same distinction between critics, but
categorizes the two groups as supporters of ‘alternative development’ and ‘alternatives to
development.’12 As I continue to discuss these two viewpoints, I will categorize these two
sets of critics as supporters of 'alternative development' and 'alternatives to development.'

Giles Mohan & Kristian Stokke. “Participatory Development and Empowerment: The
Dangers of Localism,” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 2 (Apr., 2000): 247.
12
Arturo Escobar. Encountering development: The making and unmaking of the Third
World. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), quoted in Diana Mitlin, Sam Hickey &
Anthony Bebbington. “Reclaiming development? NGOs and the challenge of alternatives.” Global
Poverty Research Group. (2006): 8.
11
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Table 2.1: SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS
“Little A”
Alternative
Development

Neoliberal
Development

New Policy
Agenda

Alternatives to
Development

NGO role in
economic
development

Fill the gaps
between the
market and the
state through
promoting “good
governance” and
the
democratization
of civil society

Fill the gaps
between the
market and the
state through
promoting
neoliberal
economic policy

Fill the gaps
between the
market and the
state by
combining
‘alternative
development’
and ‘neoliberal
development

NGOs offer
alternatives to
traditional
development and
serve as a means
for progressive
change

Objectives

To promote
entrepreneurship and
strengthen social
capital to
encourage
groups to find
solutions to their
own livelihood
needs
People-centered
approach:
participation and
empowerment
within existing
power structure

To transfer
training and
skills to help
communities
compete in
markets

To create
domestic
demand for
goods and
services,
improve
productivity, and
mobilize the
community and
the market
Marketization
and privatization
Democratization
of civil society

To challenge
current state and
market interests
through bottomup mobilization

Cooperate with
the state

Cooperate with
the state

Strategies

Relations
with the
state

Market-based
solutions: strong
property rights,
free markets,
entrepreneurial
freedom

Cooperate with
the state

People-centered
approach:
participation and
empowerment to
challenge current
state and market
interests
Oppose the state
/ seek to reform
it

NOTE: While I list ‘little A alternative development,’ ‘neoliberal development,’
and the ‘new policy agenda’ as three separate development frameworks, all three
fall within the larger ‘alternative development.’ When I discuss ‘alternative
development’ vs. ‘alternatives to development,’ I am discussing all three of these
development frameworks simultaneously. In order to prevent confusion, I will
refer to the specific ‘alternative development’ framework as ‘little A alternative
development’ and the larger—which encompasses all three of the development
frameworks—simply as ‘alternative development.’
6

ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT
The 'little A alternative development' framework with the larger ‘asserts that
NGOs should work within existing development channels and serve to fill gaps between
the market and the state by promoting democratization and the growth of a robust civil
society.13 This set of analysts identify NGOs as “critical safety nets” which mitigate the
weaknesses in the development process.14 NGOs should seek to provide alternative routes
to development primarily through the contribution of new ideas and programs, which
make services more relevant to the poor and more subject to democratic influences.15
NGOs are key actors in promoting the “progressive development agenda” by bringing
ideas about participation, empowerment, gender, and environment to economic
development, allowing NGOs to dually promote economic value creation alongside
social welfare.16 In this way, NGOs can pursue objectives the government has previously
ignored or is unable to fill and be a viable alternative in development assistance
provision.17 These NGO alternatives primarily exist to target those who do not benefit
from traditional development or are marginalized by the existing system.
More specifically, supporters of 'little A alternative development' view NGOs as
providing an attractive “people-centered” approach to development. They assert that
NGOs hold a comparative advantage in fostering local participation as they have better

Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 444.
Hildy Teegen, Jonathan P. Doh & Sushil Vachani. “The Importance of
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global Governance and Value Creation: An
International Business Research Agenda.” The Journal of International Business Studies 35, no. 6
(Nov. 2004): 468.
15
John Clark. “Democratizing Development: NGOs and the State,” Development in
Practice 2, no., 3 (Oct., 1992): 152.
16
Lewis & Kanji, NGOs and Development, 17.
17
Hedayat Allah Nikkhah & Ma’rof Bin Redzuan. “The Role of NGOs in Promoting
Empowerment for Sustainable Community Development.” Journal of Human Ecology 30, no. 2
(2010): 85.
13
14
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connections and presence at the grassroots level.18 This 'people-centered development', or
rather 'participatory development' views people themselves as being experts on their
problems and that they should be actively involved in forming solutions.19 Active
involvement within the ‘alternative development’ sphere is largely achieved through the
promotion of entrepreneurship and the strengthening of social capital among vulnerable
groups to encourage them to find their own solutions to their livelihood needs.20

NEOLIBERAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Within the larger 'alternative development’, 'neoliberal development policy’ is a
variant which places NGOs within the context of neoliberal growth—a development
context of shrinking states and expanding markets.21 As countries develop, strides in
economic growth are met with widening gaps between the market and the state, which
neoliberals see as leaving a larger space for NGO intervention. Within neoliberal
development, NGOs are identified as being “everything governments are not.”22 Their
role is to fill these widening gaps in development by promoting privatization and
democratic governance reform.23
Neoliberals view NGOs as the ideal actors for solving policy issues through
market-based solutions.24 As identified by 'alternative development' critics, neoliberals
also see NGOs as ideal actors for promoting economic development alongside social

18

Werker & Ahmed, NGOs and Development, 80.
Lewis & Kanji, NGOs and Development, 40.
20
Sangeeta Kamat. “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a
Neoliberal Era.” Review of International Political Economy 11, no.1 (Feb, 2004): 169.
21
Ibid., 156.
22
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 444.
23
Lewis & Kanji, NGOs and Development, 41.
24
Ibid., 5.
19
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justice. Neoliberals assert that NGOs can advance human well-being through enforcing
strong property rights, free markets, and free trade and liberating entrepreneurial freedom
and skills.25 NGOs do this through the transfer of training and skills to help communities
and individuals compete in markets, the provision of welfare services by those
marginalized by the market, and the democratization and growth of civil society.26 In
practice, NGOs may promote micro-level income-generating activities such as
microcredit programs or vocational training to promote small business development, as a
means of providing services where the market and state cannot.27
Similar to ‘little A alternative development,’ ‘neoliberal development’ also
employs ‘participatory development.’ However, Mohan & Stokke clarify that this revised
neoliberal position represents a ‘top-down’ strategy where empowerment can be pursued
within the “existing social order [and] without any significant negative effects upon the
power of the powerful.” Working within the existing power structure is a general trend
within these “neoliberal” development initiatives, as they are pursued through
collaboration of NGOs and state agencies.28

NEW POLICY AGENDA
The ‘New Policy Agenda’ combines ‘little A alternative development’ and
‘neoliberal frameworks.’29 This framework takes the “good governance” aspect of ‘little
A alternative development’—primarily ideas about participation and empowerment—and
25

Ibid.
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 444.
27
John Cameron. “Development Economics, the New Institutional Economics and
NGOs.” Third World Quarterly 21, no. 4, NGO Futures Beyond Aid (Aug., 2000): 627.
28
Mohan & Stokke, “Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of
Localism,” 248.
29
Lewis & Kanji, NGOs and Development, 41.
26
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combines them with neoliberal economic policy prescriptions. The New Policy Agenda is
comprised of two principal strategies: the marketization and privatization influenced by
neoliberal ideals, and the democratization of civil society influenced by the ‘little A
alternative development’ paradigm.30
The first strategy—targeting economic markets and the private sector—places
NGOs in the role of “efficient and cost-effective service providers” particularly of social
welfare.31 Supporters of the New Policy Agenda see NGOs as the most efficient actors
for “achieving economic growth, producing goods, and providing services for the
poor.”32 The second strategy—the promotion of “good governance”—places NGOs in an
advocacy role, which aims to support civil society and promote communication and
participation among beneficiaries. Through encouraging good governance, NGOs are
simultaneously promoting democracy, which many argue is a prerequisite for a healthy
economy.33
As with both ‘little A alternative development’ and neoliberal discourses, gaps in
development are a driving force in the rise of NGOs within the New Policy Agenda.
Within environments where the state and the public sector are unable or unwilling to
deliver adequate development, NGOs are ideal actors to step in and fill the void.34 In
these contexts, NGO intervention should ideally complement government strategies—
specifically in regards to poverty alleviation and economic development initiatives

Kamat, “The Privatization of Public Interest: Theorizing NGO Discourse in a
Neoliberal Era,” 170.
31
Michael Edwards & David Hulme. “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official
Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations.” World Development 24, no. 6 (1996): 1.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
S. Akbar Zaidi. “NGO Failure and the Need to Bring Back the State.” Journal of
International Development 11, no. 2 (Mar/Apr., 1999):261.
30
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among the poor. Intervention should aim to create domestic demand for goods and
services, improve productivity, and mobilize the community and the market.35 As NGOs
shoulder greater responsibilities of sustainable development, particularly among the most
vulnerable and hard to reach within developing countries, they become more crucial
actors in state operations.
While NGOs may be ideal actors to pursue these agendas, their close alignment
with the state and the market has the potential to be problematic. Stephen Commins
hypothesizes that NGOs are in danger of cloaking government inactions or indifference
to human suffering or that they simply may not possess the capacity to fill these
increasing gaps in development.36 Similarly, Edwards and Hulme reject the idea that
NGOs are the “panacea for the ills that afflict underdeveloped countries,” asserting that
this places “high and unfair expectations” on the NGO sector.37 These critiques present
two troubling issues: First is that NGOs may simply lack the capacity to fill growing gaps
in development within particular countries, or their solutions may not be sustainable in
the long-term. The fragmentation of the NGO sector, NGO dependence on outside
funding, and their vulnerability to changing contexts, all hinder the sustainability of
large-scale service provision.38 Second, even if NGOs can fill development gaps, their
ability to do so may result in the inaction of traditional development actors. Especially in
countries where the gaps in development are exceptionally wide—whether that be
GOM. “Policy Framework for Poverty Alleviation Program,” Longwe PAP
Coordinating Unit, Ministry of Economic Planning and Development (1995), quoted in, Fletcher
Tembo. “The Multi-Image Development NGO: An Agent of the New Imperialism?” Development
in Practice 13, no. 5 (Nov., 2003): 530.
36
Stephen Commins. “NGOs: ladles in the global soup kitchen?” Development in
Practice 9, no. 5 (Nov., 1999): 620.
37
Edwards & Hulme, Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance
and Accountability in the Post Cold-War World, 3.
38
Edwards & Hulme, “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on
Nongovernmental Organizations,” 4.
35
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through state inaction or inability to intervene—traditional development actors may
become increasingly dependent upon the NGO sector and become even less active in
development promotion.

ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT
Critics of 'alternative development,' and with it ‘little A alternative development,’
‘neoliberal development’ and the ‘New Policy Agenda,’ view the current development
paradigm as “fundamentally flawed” in that it creates a space “in which only certain
things [can] be said.”39 These radical critics claim that empowerment “requires a
structural transformation of economic and political relations towards a radically
democratized society,” and therefore seek alternatives to existing development
paradigms.40 They are skeptical of democratization and see neoliberal top-down
approaches as propping up existing power structures. These critics reject development
and fear that NGOs are at risk of becoming “attachments to the machine of
development.41 Supporters of 'alternatives to development’ also argue that the closeness
of NGOs to the mainstream undermines their comparative advantage as development
agents.42 These critics support NGO expansion based upon their ability to offer a
different institutional form than the state.43 Therefore, instead of filling the gap between
the market and the state, NGOs should serve as “vehicles for progressive change.”44

Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 445.
Ibid.
41
Ibid., 446.
42
Edwards & Hulme, “Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on
Nongovernmental Organizations,” 3.
43
Zaidi, “NGO Failure and the Need to Bring Back the State,” 263.
44
Lewis & Kanji, NGOs and Development, 3.
39
40
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Similar to supporters of ‘alternative development,’ those advocating ‘alternatives
to development’ also stress the role of NGOs in promoting ‘participation’ and
‘empowerment,’ but with very different agendas. 45 Mohan & Stokke emphasize that this
form of empowerment and participation seeks to challenge current state and market
interests through bottom-up mobilization.46 Unlike the objectives of the three ‘alternative
development’ frameworks, supporters of ‘alternatives to development’ view NGOs as
being capable of constructing a civil society able to transform existing power
relationships and challenging the state and society.47 So while both of these discourses
look to “civil society, participation, and ordinary people for their development vision,”
their definitions of what constitutes true economic development differ widely.48

WHY NGOS MATTER

NGO ADVANTAGES AND FUNCTIONS
NGOs hold distinct advantages in promoting economic development. Streeten
identifies the advantages of NGOs as: their ability to reach and mobilize the poor, to
empower people to improve their quality of life and strengthen local institutions, to carry
out projects at lower costs and more efficiently than government, and to promote

45

Ibid.
Mohan & Stokke, “Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of
Localism,” 249.
47
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 445.
48
R. Peets & M. Watts. “Liberation ecology: development, sustainability, and
environment in an age of market triumphalism.” Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development
and Social Movements (London: Routledge, 1996): 1-45, quoted in Mohan & Stokke,
“Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism,” 247.
46
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sustainable development.49 The World Bank identifies similar NGO advantages, in that
NGOs strengths lie in their ability to reach poor communities and remotes areas, promote
local participation, operate at low cost, identify local needs, build on local resources, and
introduce new technologies.50
All of these advantages display how NGOs are operationally situated to reach the
most vulnerable in society—those excluded from mainstream economic development.
Through employing participatory development strategies at the local level, NGOs are
ideal actors for targeting those which existing services cannot. In this way, NGOs possess
a comparative advantage in addressing the needs of the poor and vulnerable in society
over governments.51 As efficient and cost-effective service providers, NGOs are well
situated to create programs for the poor, especially the formation of entrepreneurial civil
societies to promote sustainable development.52
Advantages in targeting the most vulnerable in society hold true when considering
NGOs as both ‘alternatives to development’ and ‘alternative development.’ Within
‘alternative development,’ as countries continually shift towards market economies,
NGOs can focus on reaching the segments of society that might not be profitable for
firms and private investors.53 Especially when working with marginalized groups:
women, refugees, and minorities, NGOs can provide economic opportunities to groups
investors find unprofitable. These advantages are increasingly driving NGOs to enter into

P. Streeten. “Non-governmental Organizations and Development.” Annals of the
America Academy of Political and Social Science, 554 (1997): 193-210.
50
World Bank, Key Issues and Themes / NGO Capacity Building of Southern NGOs –
The Experience of the World Bank (1998), quoted in Kamat, “The Privatization of the Public
Interest,” 169.
51
Zaidi, “NGO Failure and the Need to Bring Back the State,” 262.
52
Kamat, “The Privatization of the Public Interest,” 164.
53
Ibid.
49
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profit-oriented businesses such as printing, garments, private universities, and
consultancy services.54 NGOs promoting ‘alternatives to development’ support
marginalized segments of society by providing alternatives outside the market. These
critics see NGOs as being witnesses to the “devastation wrought by privatization and
marketization” and seek to provide alternatives for those on the losing end of economic
development.55
The adaptability of the NGO sector also gives them the advantage in working
with a variety of international actors. Many development analysts identify NGOs as
existing within a web of relationships.56 Their flexible nature has helped them to forge
innovative and complex relationships with one another, government agencies, social
movements, international development agencies, and transnational issue networks.57
Cameron describes NGOs as moving “in the triangular space between civil society, the
state, and markets.58 Similarly, Fisher views NGOs as connected with local, regional,
national, and international levels.59 These webs of relationships place NGOs in an
intermediary role for both funding and the transfer of ideas.
Recognizing that NGOs provide an alternative and more flexible funding channel,
funding is increasingly being directed through NGOs.60 The idea that NGOs work in

54
Jude L. Fernando & Alan W. Heston. “NGOs between States, Markets, and Civil
Society.” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 554, The Role of
NGOs: Charity and Empowerment (Nov., 1007): 14.
55
Kamat, “The Privatization of the Public Interest,” 167.
56
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 450.
57
Ibid., 441.
58
Cameron, “Development Economics, the New Institutional Economics and NGOs,”
632.
59
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 450.
60
Lewis & Kanji, NGOs and Development, 16; Hildy Teegen, Jonathan P. Doh and
Sushil Vachani. “The Importance of Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) in Global
Governance and Value Creation: An International Business Research Agenda.” The Journal of
International Business Studies 35, no. 6 (Nov. 2004): 469.
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conjunction with the state and the market is supported more by the ‘alternative
development’ approach, especially because a significant amount of these funds come
from state governments and private corporations. However, NGOs existing as
‘alternatives to development’ are closely linked with civil society and existing social
movements.
Connections and links to funding also result in partnerships. In his paper on the
changing relationships between development NGOs and development policy, David
Lewis discusses the shifts from NGOs implementing their own development projects to a
partnership approach. He specifically analyzes NNGOs (Northern NGOs) as they form
linkages with SNGOs to fund and work alongside them. These shifts place NNGOs in an
intermediary position acting as the go-between between industrialized countries,
communities, and NGOs in the south. This emerging power structure within development
policy characterizes SNGOs as needing “nurturing and support,” which NNGOs provide
through training and funding.61 This partnership is an NGO strategy occurring within
both categories of development frameworks—‘alternatives to development’ and
‘alternative development,’—as these linkages are based upon mutual goals of northern
and southern NGOs.

CHALLENGES
The increasing importance of NGOs in development—largely a symptom of the
recognition of their development advantages—does not come without challenges. Fisher
claims that heavy praise of the NGO sector is placing unrealistic expectations on NGOs,
David Lewis. “Development Policy and Development NGOs: The Changing
Relationship.” Social Policy and Administration 32, no. 5 (Dec., 1998): 1-4.
61
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which they very well may be unable to meet.62 The idea that NGOs are “magic bullets”
that will “mysteriously but effectively find their target” may be too idealistic as it fails to
account for the multitude of factors affecting NGO operations.63
A key factor this idealistic viewpoint fails to account for is that NGOs are victims
of context. While NGOs possess distinct advantages in operating at the local level, this
study argues that they are not immune to the social, economic, and political forces at the
national and international levels. These forces can pose conflicting power relations and
social inequalities, and pose significant barriers to NGO operations.64

NGOS AND THE STATE
The viewpoint that NGOs operate separately from the state is especially
problematic. While many NGOs do not work directly with the state, the perceived
separation of NGOs from government fails to consider that NGOs must exist within the
national policy environment. The relationship the NGO sector develops with a state will
vary significantly country to country and differ based upon the objectives the NGO is
pursuing and the laws and regulations that accompany their work.65 So as victims of their
context, NGOs must choose how best to react to the environment created by the state
government.
In his analysis of NGOs and their relationship with the state, John Clark wrote:
“NGOs can oppose the state, complement it, or reform it—but they cannot ignore
it.”66
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Supporters of the larger 'alternative development' argue that NGOs should
complement the state by filling the gaps in government services.67 They claim that
collaborating with the state to align their objectives with those of the government can
help advance NGO intervention and give NGOs a greater chance of achieving impact.68
In these roles, NGOs rise out of gaps in development: either the failure of state-led
approaches or the unwillingness of the state to address underdevelopment.69
Within this field of thought, cooperation with the state exists on two distinct
levels: First is the idea that NGOs should seek to improve government services. Whaites
argues that NGOs should include state capacity building as a key component of their
projects.70 Because NGOs possess direct connections to beneficiaries, they are the ideal
actors to make government services more relevant to the vulnerable portions of society.71
The second level of cooperation is more of a tolerance between the state and
NGOs rather than a collaboration. Clark identifies this as a “friendly coexistence”
between NGOs and governments when NGOs solely require the freedom to pursue their
development operations and are not seeking to influence wider areas of development
planning.72 Because these projects do not pose a challenge to state operations, the state
will not pose additional barriers to these NGOs.73 Even if these initiatives do not openly
complement state operations, the mere fact that the NGO is not working counter to the
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government will leave the NGO untouched from government barriers.74 While this handsoff relationship can function under particular circumstances, the inaction of government
can also pose issues in areas with poor infrastructure and few resources.75
Tensions arise between the state and NGO sector when the development theory of
an NGO is different from that of the government, which is often the case with NGOs
stressing people’s participation, empowerment, and democracy.76 While supporters of
NGOs as ‘alternatives to development’ view NGO-led state opposition as a key role of
NGO initiatives—as they argue that the advantages of NGOs lie in their ability to offer a
different institutional form than the state—the barriers presented when pursuing these
objectives is pushing many NGOs to change their strategies for relating to the state.77
NGOs are increasingly pursuing interventions that do not actively oppose the
state. These development initiatives often promote participation and empowerment within
existing state power structures and seek to promote economic development to take
pressure off of existing state services. Projects of this nature seek to improve the standard
of living for the most vulnerable in society—many times groups which existing services
do not reach. While many argue that the inability to restructure existing power systems is
a core weakness of NGO operations, Clark argues that it displays their capacity for
political analysis, self-awareness, and persuasiveness.78 Based upon this argument, NGOs
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are aware of their inability to provide solutions to national problems, and seek to work
where they have the advantage.79
In the following chapters, I will apply Clark and Whaites’ generalizations
regarding NGOs and their relationship with the state to test their relevance in practice.
Through both my secondary analysis of NGOs working with Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon and my case study of Cives Mundi and their experience working with the
Lebanese central government throughout their intervention I will examine the validity of
Clark and Whaites’ arguments and address their shortcomings.

DONOR PRESSURE
Both ‘alternative development’ and ‘alternatives to development’ recognize that
NGOs adapt to donor pressure. Very few NGOs are self-funded and therefore cannot
pursue their projects without outside support.80 The dependence upon donor money and
the desire of NGOs to satisfy donors’ demands results in NGO expansion that many view
as almost entirely “donor-driven.”81
Donor power is rooted within a sector environment where money is scarce and
NGOs are plentiful. These conditions create rising competition amongst NGOs for
funding resources—not only against one another, but against private-sector development
firms as well.82 The increased competition for resources gives donors the power to choose
which types of projects they want to support. On the one hand, donor power can be
positive. Through funding allocation, donors can ensure the most competitive projects get
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the money.83 Their funding calls can specify particular added-value elements such as
replicability, scaling-up, gender benchmarks, and environmental requirements to be
included within development projects. Donor control can also increase the transparency
of NGO projects, as they can set the standards for audits and external investigations. On
the other hand, donor power can be a tool for funders to pursue their own objectives. The
close collaboration between NGOs and governments becomes particularly contentious
when considering that national governments are often the largest financial contributor to
NGOs, deepening their influence over NGO intervention.84
With Northern NGOs, particularly, national governments from the North are
channeling money through NNGOs to provide development aid in the south. In these
situations, NNGOs find themselves caught between “one country’s concern and the
problems of people in another.”85 Critics of ‘alternative development’ argue that this
relationship forces NNGOs to pursue the agenda of the state and market rather than that
of the poor. NNGOs, then, are simply “operating in the shadows of the neo-liberal
agenda” motivated by the influx of money to fill the gap where the state is absent.86 This
radical viewpoint sees NNGOs as slowly converting into public service contractors as
they become increasingly professionalized and depoliticized.87
The argument that NGOs are becoming increasingly depoliticized is well
supported within development literature. The core rationale behind this shift is that NGOs
are less willing to pursue objectives conflicting with their funders and home governments
83
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(though they are frequently one and the same).88 Their vulnerability as beneficiaries of
outside funding and support is a key driver pushing NGOs to change their goals.89 The
result is an NGO sector that is shying away from social mobilization towards the
provision of services and development initiatives.90

ADDRESSING ROOT CAUSES OF PROBLEMS
The trend that NGOs are shifting their objectives to align with states and donors is
supported by the claim that NGOs do not address the root causes of problems.91 Within
these environments, NGOs actively campaigning for political change and the
strengthened rights of beneficiaries may threaten their established interests and risk
losing their financial and political support.92 For this reason, NGOs are as likely to
maintain the status quo as to change it, causing them to address symptoms of
underdevelopment rather than root causes.93 This is a key critique from radicals or the
‘alternatives to development’ perspective,’ who see NGOs promoting ‘alternative
development’ as supporting an existing power structure that is keeping marginalized
populations from being independent.94
Another key factor disabling NGOs from addressing the root causes of
underdevelopment is simply their capacity. The majority of NGOs are small, and the
NGOs sector is incredibly fragmented; while these traits provide many advantages to
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local development initiatives, they also result in micro-successes that can rarely be
scaled-up enough to affect the macro-level or be powerful enough to completely
restructure oppressive power systems. For example, an NGO project providing
professional training to 100 vulnerable individuals may impact the economy surrounding
community, but will most likely have no affect on a macro-economic scale. Therefore,
while NGOs may successfully promote economic development within a community, they
are rarely able to restructure larger power systems and resource allocation methods which
may be hindering development within a state or for a particular group.95

NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Despite being the “favored child of official development agencies,” NGOs may
not be the “new panacea to cure all the ills that have befallen the development process” as
previously thought.96 As the challenges facing the NGO sector continue to weigh against
its distinct advantages, it is becoming clearer that the operational impact of NGOs in
promoting economic development may be less than previously claimed.97
However, these assertions do not hold true for all NGOs. The roles of the NGO
sector are constantly redefined as contexts and objectives continue to shift.98 The
fragmentation of the NGO sector, displayed through the wide differentiation of
organizational structure, strategies, objectives, and areas of intervention, make
generalizations regarding NGO roles in development inherently problematic. While the
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preceding analysis of the conventional wisdom regarding these roles and their outcomes
can provide key insights regarding general trends in the NGO sector, these observations
do not hold true across the board to all development NGOs.99 In order to assess how
NGOs promote economic development in practice, analyzing what is happening within
specific organizations and places is imperative and is what I aim to do in the remaining
sections of this study.100
Current empirical studies regarding the NGO sector are typically placed within
the ‘development studies’ research agenda, which is an interdisciplinary field employing
a wide range of research methodologies.101 Quantitative studies, such as Salamon and
Anheier’s “Study of the Third Sector,” aim to measure the “relative size and scope of the
sector” to draw conclusions regarding the nature of NGOs and the implications of their
intervention.102 The findings of these studies further reveal the claimed diversity of the
NGO sector and the implications of the varying roles NGOs play in development.103 The
weaknesses of these studies—the fact that they do not provide insight into how NGO
diversity functions in practice and within particular organizations and environments—is
supplemented by smaller, qualitative studies. These qualitative studies largely utilize
ethnographic work or case study research to contextualize theoretical arguments through
detailed descriptions.104 For example, Maxine Wesgrau’s ethnography of NGOs in
northern India aims to understand the NGO sector within a specific time and place.105
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The contextual nature of these studies does not aid in the generalizability of the NGO
sector, but rather exposes the oversimplification of universal theories regarding NGOs as
previously discussed. 106
William Fisher claims that development literature is “based more on faith than
fact,” and that detailed studies of what is happening within specific organizations and
places which “unpack literature” will provide key insights into the practical functions of
the NGO sector. 107 Similarly, Edwards and Hulme claim that sharing ideas and
experiences from practical experience is much more useful than reaching artificial
agreements. 108 Based upon the objective of utilizing this research for the practical benefit
of the NGO sector, my study of NGOs promoting economic development among
Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon will provide a better understanding of the practical
functions of NGOs within specific places at specific times. This study looks to link
generalizations with practical experiences in order to critically examine the viability of
development literature as I apply them to NGOs promoting economic development
among Palestinians refugees in Lebanon. I will investigate how a lack of understanding
of how NGOs operate in specific contexts causes international development to miss the
target and places NGOs in development roles they ate unable to fill. Through my
practical application of development literature, I will provide evidence to the core
argument of this study: that NGOs are unable to fill development gaps when contexts of
intervention are not conducive to their operations.
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CHAPTER 3:

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Existing development frameworks do not provide adequate analyses regarding
how NGOs promote economic development in practice. In order to analyze how NGOs
promote economic development within specific contexts, and how these contexts impact
the NGO strategies, this study investigates NGO operations promoting economic
development among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
In this study, the context of intervention—the geographical environment, donor
context, and relations with the state—serves as the independent variable. I argue that the
interplay of these factors directly impacts NGO intervention—the dependent variable.
This study will analyze how a specific context of intervention impacts NGO development
projects and results in distinct advantages and challenges.
In this study, I will apply the generalizations I analyze throughout the preceding
literature review to a descriptive, exploratory case study of the development NGO Cives
Mundi and their intervention aimed towards promoting economic independence among
Palestinian refugees within Lebanese refugee camps. I will be analyzing Cives Mundi’s
most recent development project Tatreez— focused on promoting economic
empowerment among Palestinian refugee women through the formation of a weaving coop—to evaluate the experience of Cives Mundi throughout their intervention.
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In order to avoid shortcomings of single case study methodology—most
commonly that one case is not enough to draw sound empirical findings—I will also
evaluate secondary data regarding NGOs promoting economic development among
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This will reduce response bias both from interviewees,
Cives Mundi’s reports, and my own observations.109 This chapter will assess the NGO
sector in Lebanon to evaluate the existing information regarding NGOs promoting
economic development among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and how this environment
is conducive or harmful to NGO development initiatives. In this section, I will identify
the key advantages of and barriers to NGO projects targeting Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon and analyze how these environments impact NGO strategies.
I will apply my findings from the secondary analysis to an exploratory case study
of the development NGO Cives Mundi and their project Tatreez. Conducting a practical
analysis of a specific project and area of implementation will provide practical insights to
NGO functions in reaction to their environment.
I am using single case study methodology because this research surrounds an
extreme, unique case, which I think has something special to reveal regarding how NGOs
choose to respond to their environment. Studies of this nature are useful for investigating
dynamic, experiential and complex processes and areas—especially to examine how
organizations adapt to fast-changing and fluid environments.110 Through evaluating the
experience of Cives Mundi and their responses to their shifting environment, this study
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will provide insight as to why NGOs function and strategize in particular ways.111 I will
draw these conclusions by identifying key advantages and barriers Cives Mundi
experiences throughout their intervention and examining how the organization adapts
their strategies in response to the changing environment. The study will combine holistic
case study methodology—examining the case as one unit by focusing on issues of Cives
Mundi’s organizational culture and strategy, and an embedded case study design—
exploring individual sub units such as: roles, locations, and meetings within the context
of the development project Tatreez.
In her article Using Case Studies in Research, featured in Management Research
News, Jennifer Rowley of Manchester Metropolitan University claims that these
methodologies allow researchers to paint an overall organizational picture, which is what
I aim to do through my case study.112 Combining these two case study methodologies
will ensure that my study is not taking a superficial view of the case. Delving deeper into
a single case will also allow the study to develop a high level of “conceptual validity,”
which Alexander George and Andrew Bennett identify as a key strength of case study
research. In their book, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
George & Bennett support one of the primary claims of my study: that conclusions from
one country may be completely different from conclusions from another, so direct
comparisons may be of little use. Single case study research, however, is advantageous in
making “contextualized comparisons” by searching for similarities and discrepancies
across contexts. In other words, case study research can evaluate a phenomenon in its
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context and expand on existing frameworks by combining generalizations with practical
insights.113 As I am evaluating my case study within the context of my secondary analysis
and my broad literature review, this research will add to existing development
frameworks and critically test their validity in the context of Lebanon. Through this
methodology, my study aims to develop a “higher level of validity over a smaller number
of cases” in order to address the important role contextual factors play in NGO
intervention.114 Because this case is so unique, using multiple case study methodology to
directly compare experiences would also pose challenges in terms of data availability and
hinder the depth of the case study.
The case study of Cives Mundi and Tatreez will use multiple data sources:
interviews with Cives Mundi’s project manager and the project technician for the
Lebanon section, internal narrative reports, strategies and proposals, a documentary
detailing the project and its outcomes, external evaluation recommendations from the EU,
and direct observations from working within Cives Mundi’s headquarter office.
The final section will place the case study in the context of existing literature.
This section will use the preceding development frameworks as a template to compare
the results of the case study in order to contextualize the trends I reveal throughout my
primary observations.115
As a whole, this study is limited in terms of both generalizability and replicability.
However, this research does not seek to better understand these development frameworks
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by artificially replicating previous studies to add to existing generalizations; this study
seeks to evaluate these frameworks in a particular context to analyze how Cives Mundi is
promoting economic development and why they are employing their particular strategies.
This methodology is also appropriate as this study evaluates an extreme, unique case that
will critically test existing development frameworks.116
In terms of future research, this study can also serve as a preliminary or pilot to
multiple case studies, or as a foundation for future statistical studies. As Palestinian
refugees continue to reside in Lebanon, additional research regarding NGO intervention
could give more insight in regards to effective strategies for NGO adaptation.
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CHAPTER 4:

SECONDARY ANALYSIS: NGOS PROMOTING ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT AMONG PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

INTRODUCTION
In order to develop a reference point to validate the results of my single case
study methodology, this section will evaluate secondary data regarding NGOs promoting
economic development among Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. In this chapter, I will
cover a brief historical overview of the economic state of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon, assess the roles of NGOs promoting economic development among these
groups. I will use this foundation to evaluate how this environment is conducive or
harmful to NGO development initiatives by identifying key advantages and barriers to
NGO projects targeting Palestinian refugees.
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HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
Table 4.1: TIMELINE OF PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON
1943
1948

1949

1957-1958
1967

1969

1970
1973

1975

1978
1982

 Lebanon is recognized as an independent state with close ties to the
west117
 State of Israel is established
 Est. 750,00 Palestinians are displaced from their homes & est. 100,000
flee to Lebanon118
 UN establishes the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA) to advocate and provide services to Palestinian refugees in
Arab host countries119
 Rising unrest within Lebanon due to religious and political tension
 First civil war breaks out120
 The Six-Day Arab-Israeli War121
 PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) establishes bases in
Lebanon122
 The Cairo Declaration between PLO leadership and the Lebanese
army—puts an end to the fighting and “regulates” Palestinians’
presence in Lebanon123
 PLO transfers leadership from Jordan to Lebanon, further intensifying
the conflict124
 Israel kills three Palestinian leaders with prominent positions in the
PLO
 Lebanese government resigns125
 Christian gunman attacks bus in Beirut killing 27—mostly
Palestinian—passengers
 Clashes lead to the outbreak of the second Lebanese civil war 126
 South Lebanon conflict—victory by Israel and PLO expelled from
Southern Lebanon
 Israeli military victory / Syrian de facto occupation of Lebanon 127
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1989-1990
1991
1991-present

 PLO “expulsion” from Lebanon—remains active in Lebanon, but is
severely weakened128
 Shrinking PLO services, rising role of NGOs 129
 The Taif Accords end the Lebanese civil war 130
 The Lebanese army defeats the PLO131
 Oslo Accords between the PLO and Israeli government
 The Lebanese state excludes Palestinian refugee camps from postwar
rebuilding strategies
 The Weakened state of the PLO in Lebanon creates results in the rising
role of NGOs to supplement UNRWA service provision132

PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON:
ONGOING TENSION AND RESTRICTIVE POLICY
The long-term presence of the Palestinian refugee population, the role of the PLO
in the Lebanese civil war, and the view that these refugee groups place a “burden” on the
Lebanese state and the economy has resulted in exclusive, restrictive policies vis-à-vis
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.
The Lebanese state views Palestinian refugees as “temporary guests” who are the
responsibility of the international community. This impermanent status grants Palestinian
refugees the right to reside temporarily in Lebanon, but no other economic, social, or
legal rights.133
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On an international policy level, Lebanon has not ratified the Geneva Convention
of 1951 nor the 1967 Protocol related to the Status of Refugees.134 At the national level,
Palestinian refugees within Lebanon do not have the right to own or inherit property, the
right to primary or secondary education, or the right to utilize public health or social
security services.135 This “restrictive and exclusive” approach towards the Palestinian
refugee population denies them access to the legal, economic, and social system.136
From an economic standpoint, Lebanese restrictions on Palestinian refugees
hinder their opportunities for economic development. First, Lebanese policy severely
limits Palestinian participation in the labor force. While Palestinian refugees in Jordan
and Syria have the right to work, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon only recently gained
the right to work in restricted careers and are excluded completely from professions such
as law and medicine.137
In the past, Lebanese labor law was based on the principles of reciprocity and the
requirement to obtain a work permit. The principle of reciprocity—which stated that
Lebanon would treat foreign workers with the same benefits Lebanese citizens received
in their country of origin—did not account for the statelessness of Palestinians. This
principle denied work permits or social security benefits to Palestinians, because they
lacked a state, which could provide those rights to foreign Lebanese workers.138

134
Delphine Torres Tailfer, “Women and Economic Power in Lebanon: The Legal
framework and challenges to women’s economic empowerment,” Collective for Research and
Training Development (Seminar, National Knowledge-Sharing Seminar, Beirut, 2010): 25.
135
ANERA Report 3
136
Suleiman Jaber, “Marginalised Community: The Case of Palestinian Refugees in
Lebanon,” Development Research Center on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty, April 2006:
3.
137
Nada Al-Nashif & Samir El-Khoury, “Palestinian Employment in Lebanon: Facts and
Challenges,” 21; Khalili, “A Landscape of uncertainty: Palestiniana in Lebanon,” 34.
138
Al-Nashif & El-Khoury, “Palestinian Employment in Lebanon: Facts and
Challenges,” 21.

34

In 2005, the Lebanese government issued a memorandum allowing Palestinian
refugees born in Lebanon who register with the Lebanese Ministry of Labor to participate
in 70 administrative and commercial professions.139 While this legislation created new
opportunities for many Palestinians in Lebanon, it maintained the ban on medicine and
law, and required Palestinians already working within these sectors informally to pay for
a work permit.140 In 2010, the Lebanese Parliament passed legislation which waived work
permit fees for Palestinian refugees born in Lebanon, and repealed the reciprocity of
treatment policy.141 While these amendments were regarded as a step in the right
direction, they maintained the ban on a list of 30 restricted professions, which are
primarily white collar positions.142
Because Lebanese policy makes it extremely difficult to find employment within
the formal economy, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon most commonly work in sectors
which do not require work permits—only about 2% of Palestinian refugees have a work
permit—and engage in agriculture, construction, sanitation, electrical, and textile
fields.143 They are employed on a productivity basis—daily or weekly for private
organizations—and work primarily in the informal economy, which leaves them
vulnerable to labor rights violations.144 Most work without a written contract, do not
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receive health coverage or sick leave, and are not entitled to a pension.145 Even skilled
Palestinians (engineers, technicians, physicians) commonly work illegally for low wages
in the private sector, and therefore do not qualify for social security provisions.146 The
“vulnerable and insecure working status” of Palestinian refugees is one of high
unemployment—particularly among youth, women, and those with higher education—
and low wages, where the average monthly income is far below minimum wage.147
The economic situation within Palestinian refugee camps is particularly dire. The
Palestinian refugee population living within refugee camps face overcrowded, substandard living conditions, where they must deal with heightened “discrimination,
isolation and social exclusion.”148 The Lebanese government limits the expansion and
reconstruction of the camps, and places tight restrictions on movement through
checkpoints.149 The restriction of movement and poor infrastructure within the camps
further hinders trade and commerce.150 Most Palestinians are unable to find jobs or start
businesses outside the camps, so many have small shops to provide goods and services
within the camps.151
The International Labour Organization & the Committee for the Employment of
Palestinian Refugees assert that:
“the development conditions of Palestinian refugees are very much
linked to their employment status, [and that] the lack of access to fair
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job opportunities and decent work is exacerbating the vicious cycle of
impoverishment and precarious conditions that Palestinians endure.”152
In their collaborative work detailing the employment challenges facing
Palestinians in Lebanon, the ILO and the Committee for the Employment of Palestinian
Refugees argue that granting economic rights to Palestinian refugees will improve their
socio-economic conditions and enable them to become less dependent on aid. They
advocate integrating Palestinian refugees into the Lebanese labor market in order to
improve the economic well-being of Palestinians as well as stability within Lebanon.153
The discrimination aimed towards Palestinian refugees—specifically restrictions
in the labor market—results in high unemployment and dependence upon the aid
structure.154 Lebanese policy vis-à-vis Palestinian employment is largely based on the
view that Palestinian refugees place a burden on the Lebanese economy and the idea that
granting Palestinians the right to work will limit job opportunities for Lebanese
citizens.155 The harsh reality is that excluding Palestinians from the labor force is forcing
their dependence on outside aid. 156

THE NGO SECTOR IN LEBANON:
KEY ACTORS – UNRWA & PLO
In 1950, two years after the displacement of the Palestinian people, the UN
established the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the
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Near East (UNRWA) to advocate and provide services to Palestinian refugees in Arab
host countries.157 At this point, the UNRWA was the sole service provider for
Palestinians living in Lebanon, because the Lebanese government banned other
organizations from operating within the refugee camps.158 The UNRWA became
responsible for providing services such as: healthcare, education, food, and shelter for
Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, and relieved the Lebanese state of the social and
economic responsibilities concerning Palestinian refugees.159 The UNRWA also worked
in coordination with the Lebanese government to create 15 camps for Palestinian
refugees living within Lebanon, however UNRWA was responsible for all service
provision within the camps and the Lebanese state became responsible only for security
provision.160
The UNRWA is criticized not only for being chronically underfunded, but also
for being limited in their coverage—both in terms of the services they provide and to the
number of people they reach. The dependence of the Palestinian people on the UNRWA
leaves significant portions of the population with limited or no access to services.161 Also,
while the majority of Palestinian refugees are “registered” refugees by the UNRWA and
the Lebanese authorities, “non-registered” and “non-identified” refugees fall outside the
UNRWA mandate and have limited access to UNRWA services.162
The PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) in Lebanon has historically
attempted to fill the gap in UNRWA services. During the height of their presence in
157
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Lebanon, the PLO led movements to establish organizations to improve living conditions
within Palestinian refugee camps.163 Specifically following the Cairo Declaration in
1969, Lebanon began to allow other organizations to provide services to Palestinian
refugees. The PLO led the movement to establish such organizations and formed
committees and institutions within the camps.164 In this way, the PLO served as an
“umbrella structure” to connect social and health institutions, which improved living
conditions within the camps.165
While the presence of the PLO largely improved the living conditions and access
to services for Palestinian refugees, the presence of the PLO was largely seen as
exacerbating the 1975-1990 civil war.166 The role of the PLO in promoting armed conflict
led to their official evacuation from Lebanon in 1982, leaving the Palestinian refugee
population dependent once again on the UNRWA as PLO-created organizations
crumpled.167

THE RISE OF NGOS IN LEBANON: ROLES AND FUNCTIONS
The shirking of responsibility on the part of the Lebanese state, the consistent
restrictions of the civil and economic rights of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, and the
dearth of UNRWA and PLO resources leaves growing space for NGO intervention to fill
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development gaps.168 In 2001, the Ajial Center, the Statistic and Documentation Office
based in Beirut, Lebanon, reported that there were 46 Arab and 20 foreign NGOs
providing assistance to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.169 These NGOs “play a dual role
of service provision in addition to advocacy,” largely to complement UNRWA
intervention.170
Within Lebanon, there are two main types of NGOs licensed to work with the
Palestinian community: First, are local NGOs “licensed by mean of attestation and
declaration granted by ministry of the interior.” Due to their close geographical and
cultural proximity, these local Arab and Islamic NGOs (SNGOs) are more involved in the
actual provision of services.171 At the same time, these NGOs are considered Palestinian,
as their administrative bodies are made up of primarily Palestinians. This “ambiguous”
status makes these organizations subject to heightened legal restrictions.172 Second, are
foreign NGOs—which must get a license by presidential decree to operate in Lebanon.173
The role of the foreign NGOs (NNGOs) is primarily one of funding, with the exception
of a few who are involved directly with refugees.174
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Table 4.2: LOCAL VS. FOREIGN NGO ROLES
Local NGOs (SNGOs)

Foreign NGOs (NNGOs)

Service provision: Implement development
projects—mostly in health and primary
education sectors—with significant funding
from foreign NGOs.

Combination of funding and/or service
provision: Fund local NGOs and their projects
/ implement their own development projects

In their 2001 study, the Ajial Center sampled 20 foreign NGOs and detailed the
nature of their activities within Palestinian refugee camps. From this sample, 12 out of
the 20 foreign NGOs identified “financial support” as a primary activity; Of these 12
funding NGOs, 7 were also involved in service provision—mostly in health and primary
education sectors.175 Of these 7 “active” foreign NGOs, 4 identified economic
development (vocational training or loans) as a key part of their activities.176
Local NGOs hold a similar pattern. The following chart shows an overview of
local NGO projects—largely funded by foreign NGOs—targeted towards Palestinian
refugees living in Lebanese refugee camps:
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Chart 4.3: NGO SERVICES IN LEBANESE REFUGEE CAMPS177
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The above graph, adapted from the Ajial Center’s 2001 study, shows the wide
range of NGO services within Lebanese refugee camps, but also a limited focus on
economic development projects. From Ajial’s sample—roughly 265 NGO projects—the
categories: income generation, loans, vocational training, and women’s training centers
only combine to about 24%.178
While the gap in PLO and UNRWA services has been partially filled by local and
foreign NGOs, their assistance still leaves significant portions of the population without
access to services, especially economic development services.179 Because the restrictions
placed upon the Palestinian refugee community leave them almost completely dependent
177
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on the aid structure–for everything from humanitarian assistance to schools and
employment—access to these basic services is imperative.180

FILLING DEVELOPMENT GAPS
The role of NGOs in development within Lebanon has primarily been to fill the
gaps between the state and the market. Throughout the entirety of the civil war (19751990), when societal needs were not being met, market and government failures created a
wide gap for NGOs.181 During this time period, NGOs—development NGOs in
particular—made up for deficiencies in existing services by complementing state
development initiatives.182
However, in the case of Palestinian refugees—where the state is largely absent—
the PLO and the UNRWA fill a quasi-state role in regards to service provision and
development among Palestinian refugees. Following the exile of the PLO from Lebanon,
the UNRWA became the primary service provider for Palestinian refugees.183 Within this
unique context, NGOs promoting “alternative development” seek to fill the gaps in
UNRWA services, not those of the state or the formal market (as Palestinians are largely
excluded from both). NGOs function similarly to government organizations, as they
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promote projects the national or local government cannot or will not.184 As the Lebanese
state continues to take a hands-off approach vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees, the central
government is becoming increasingly dependent upon NGO intervention to respond
“quickly, flexibly and effectively” to solve development issues.185

ADVANTAGES
As stated above, NGOs are thought to hold a comparative advantage in: reaching
and mobilizing the poor, empowering people to improve their quality of life, identifying
local needs, building on local resources, and introducing new technologies.186 Essentially,
NGOs are operationally situated to reach the most vulnerable in society and to target
those which existing services cannot (or will not).187 In the case of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon, NGOs are capable of reaching those without access to UNRWA services or the
opportunities to achieve economic self-sufficiency.

FUNCTIONS: A LINK TO FUNDING
Within Lebanon, international funding is the largest source of NGO revenues.188
UN agencies and bilateral donors such as: the Canadian International Development
Agency (CIDA), the Department for International Development (DFID), the European
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Union (EU), and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) all
have a significant presence in Lebanon.189
Generally, northern NGOs provide a link to funding, while southern NGOs (local,
Palestinian NGOs) are more active in service provision.190 Northern NGOs may provide
direct or indirect support to local organizations. In this role, northern NGOs finance
projects, programs and services, or provide direct services to refugees through their own
projects.191 As I identify within the literature review, the flexible nature of NGOs helps
them to forge connections at local, national, and international levels and to exist within a
complex web of relationships.192 These relationships place NNGOs in a position where
they serve as a funding link between donors in the north and NGOs and beneficiaries in
the south. As David Lewis points out, this trend placing NNGOs in an intermediary
position results in increased partnership between NNGOs and SNGOs.193

CHALLENGES FOR THE NGO SECTOR
NGOS & THE LEBANESE STATE
I maintain throughout this study that the relationship the NGO sector develops
with a state will differ country to country and vary widely based upon the nature of NGO
intervention.194 I argue that the restrictive Lebanese policies in regards to Palestinian
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refugees are further projected onto NGOs working with these groups, resulting in a
challenging environment for NGO intervention.
While supporters of ‘alternative development’ argue that NGOs should
complement the state by filling the gaps between the state and the market, this is difficult
when an NGO is targeting a group essentially excluded from both.195 Within the literature
review, I discuss Whaites’ idea that NGO cooperation with the state exists on two levels:
One, where NGOs seek to improve government services and make them more relevant to
the vulnerable portions of society, and two, where NGOs and the state coexist, but do not
actively collaborate.196 When considering NGOs targeting Palestinian refugees, the
relationship an NGO develops with the Lebanese state will most likely be the latter.
While promoting economic development among Palestinian refugees generally does not
actively challenge state operations, and therefore will not be opposed by the Lebanese
government, the hands-off approach of the central government is a barrier of its own.197
The primary barrier the Lebanese state places on the NGO sector is not
government action, but rather inaction. In regards to Palestinian refugees, the Lebanese
state handles personal identification, mobility, personal status law, and access to work. 198
While Lebanese policy—particularly vis-à-vis employment—largely excludes Palestinian
refugees from Lebanese society and economic life, it is the voluntary inaction of the
Lebanese government that has historically allowed the PLO and the UNRWA to assume
quasi-state roles in Lebanon.199
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Association Najdeh, an NGO based in Lebanon focusing on women’s
empowerment, identifies the PLO as the politically representative body of the Palestinian
people, and the UNRWA is the primary service provider.200 By assuming the
responsibilities that are typically assumed by the state, the PLO and the UNRWA should
theoretically fill the gap left by the Lebanese central government. However, the exile of
the PLO, the chronic underfunding of the UNRWA, and the exclusive, restrictive policies
placed upon Palestinian refugees by the Lebanese state result in an environment where
lack of coordination and slow bureaucratic processes affect the efficiency and
effectiveness of NGO development projects.
The relationship between the NGO sector and the Lebanese government is
described as both “unclear and unstable” and is characterized by “limited dialogue,
considerable distrust, diversion of perspectives, suspicion over intentions, and lack of
collaboration.”201 On an implementation level, the NGO sector tends to operate
separately from the central government when they work with Palestinian refugees and are
subject to few barriers when NGO objectives align with that of the Lebanese state—when
NGOs promote ‘alternative development’ rather than ‘alternatives to development.’ The
Lebanese state largely views NGOs aiming to fill the development gaps within the
existing power structure as relieving the “burden” of the refugee community, and allows
these NGOs to work freely in Lebanon—partially due to their ability to attract foreign aid
dollars. While foreign governments may hesitate to send aid directly through the
200
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Lebanese central government, there is less hesitation to funnel aid dollars through the
NGO sector. This ability of NGOs to secure funding from various sources with little
interference from the central government is a distinctive feature of the NGO sector in
Lebanon.202
While the state may not pose any direct barriers to NGO intervention, the lack of
coordination and dialogue between actors results in slow, inefficient bureaucratic
processes that are not conducive to effective intervention. The hands-off approach of the
government becomes especially problematic when considering that the central authorities
control the NGO registration process, which is a key complaint from the NGO sector
within Lebanon.203 Though most NGOs in Lebanon are registered, they also report
challenges throughout the registration process. For example, the process for and NGO to
change their mission can take years, which prevents NGOs from adapting their missions
as the nature of their projects change.204
The UNDP also reports that these bureaucratic barriers are particularly evident
among NGOs with significant numbers of Palestinian members, who communicate
experiencing increased challenges to registration.205 While the central government mostly
turns a blind eye to these Palestinian organizations, they are not legally permitted to form
their own associations in Lebanon.206 This may not directly impact the registration of
Northern NGOs in Lebanon, but as partnership approaches become more common, the
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lack of coordination between stakeholders due to slow, discriminatory bureaucratic
procedures hinders the cooperation of the NGO sector.207

GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT: SECURITY AND MOVEMENT
The relationship of the NGO sector with local municipalities is particularly
important, but also incredibly complex within Lebanese refugee camps. The political and
security situation within the camps poses barriers to NGO development initiatives, and
are particularly problematic when considering the interplay between poor infrastructure,
population growth, and violent conflict.208
Under Lebanese policy, Palestinian refugee camps are not allowed to expand
beyond their set borders. As the population within the camps continues to grow, the
living situation becomes more crowded and the population becomes more diverse. In
terms of infrastructure, this internal expansion—due to population growth within a
confined area—hinders movement within the camps.209 Because the camps are isolated
from national infrastructure systems, they are largely dependent on foreign aid for
development of infrastructure—primarily NGOs.210 The increasing population density
within the camps paired with the inadequate infrastructure not only increases the need for
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NGO-led infrastructure development but also makes it all the more difficult to meet the
increasing demand for basic services.211
In addition to infrastructure issues, the increasing diversity and growth of the
population within the camps is also conducive to conflict. In camps where there are
several military/political players, the security situation makes it difficult for NGOs to
carry out successful development projects. Especially with the rise of groups such as
Hamas, Fatah, and Hezbollah, NGOs struggle to enter the camps at all, let alone promote
long-term development. 212 In reaction to conflict, NGOs often shift towards emergency
aid and relief, and shy away from development projects. 213

COORDINATION
Political fragmentation, poor infrastructure and heightened security risks make
effective coordination among the NGO sector imperative to promoting successful
economic development. However, networking among NGOs in Lebanon is reportedly
weak. 214 The Ajial Center, the Statistics and Documentation Office, reports that the poor
communication among stakeholders leads to the duplication of work—an oversupply of
particular services and the neglect of others—in their study of the NGO sector in
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Lebanon. This lack of coordination “undermines the proper utilization of resources”
which are already in short supply.215

DONOR PRESSURE
The shortage of services and foreign aid dollars, paired with the growing number
of NGOs operating within Lebanon, is resulting in more competition for funding between
NGOs. As I discuss within the literature review, this donor power can be positive—in
that funding is only given to the most competitive, well-developed projects—but is
problematic in that it gives donors the ability to choose which types of projects they want
to support. 216
As I describe earlier in the chapter, a primary function of NNGOs in Lebanon is
to serve as a link to funding. Generally, NNGOs channel money from northern
governments or organization to SNGOs who lack access to foreign aid dollars—in this
case Palestinian NGOs. While these relationships increase the likelihood that Palestinian
NGOs will be indirectly funded, these projects will be less radical in nature. Within the
context of NGOs working with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, this means that projects
may provide services to Palestinians, or promote economic empowerment and
employment opportunities, but shy away from social mobilization and political
critique.217
During the Coordination Forum of NGOs Working Among the Palestinian
Community in Lebanon, participating organizations identified NGO-donor relations to be
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a central problem surrounding NGO intervention.218 As most NGOs rely on international
funding, they are susceptible to the conditionality accompanying foreign aid dollars.
They argue that donor conditionality surrounding funding frequently leads to NGO
projects promoting the interest of donors rather than that of the ultimate beneficiaries,
resulting in projects do not always meet local needs.219
The degree of this donor power is dependent upon the type of grants which the
UNDP divides into: easy funding—where there is open access to funding and no required
managerial structure, but also low accountability—and difficult funding—which requires
a detailed project proposal, monitoring and reporting, and a set managerial structure.220
Difficult funding is typically funding granted by donors in the north and is accompanied
with specific conditions and expectations.221 This type of funding is common within
Lebanon, as the majority of the budget for NGOs comes from external donors, primarily
the U.S. and the EU. 222
Aid dollars of this nature are accompanied by a higher degree of conditionality,
which the donor outlines in exchange for funding. In their Assessment of the Capacity
Building Needs of NGOs in Lebanon, the Canadian Fund for Social Development found
that NGOs with international funding tend to implement projects which satisfy donor
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needs. They assert that funding sources are a key factor determining what projects an
NGO implements.223 For example, NGOs are increasingly adopting free-market models
in order to attract funding from donors in the north, specifically international financial
institutions such as the IMF or World Bank.224
A symptom of this trend is that NGOs are constantly adapting their intervention
strategies in order to get funding from particular donors, hindering their abilities to
develop consistent strategies within Lebanon. The BADIL Center, the Resource Center
for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, writes:
“All Palestinian refugee organizations and NGOs suffer from budget insecurity
and dependence on donor agencies whose policies are not fully understood, and
which exert a disproportionate influence because of the scarcity of alternative
sources. Given this framework, it is difficult for them to create an overall
development strategy, expand their programs, re-target their services or
democratize their structures.”225
The result is that NGO interventions tend to be short-term and project-oriented, and lack
a clear, sustainable strategy to solve development issues among Palestinian refugees. 226

GETTING TO THE ROOTS OF DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
The inability to develop consistent, long-term strategies free from donor pressure
is directly related to the critique that NGOs do not address the root causes of
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underdevelopment.227 Within Lebanon, the NGO sector is shying away from social
mobilization, advocacy, and political critique in order to maintain funding.228 Fisher
argues that NGOs are as likely to maintain the status quo as to change it, causing them to
address symptoms rather than the root causes of underdevelopment, and NGOs within
Lebanon do not appear to be an exception.229
In regards to Palestinian refugees, the preceding overview of this group’s legal
status within Lebanon points to restrictive policies, which exclude them from traditional
development and services, leaving them dependent upon an insufficient aid structure.
Despite this, the NGO sector working with these groups is shying away from intervention
which seeks to transform the existing power structure in order to maintain their
established interests. So when considering initiatives stressing empowerment and
participation, NGO intervention may help in the short-term, but may not result in full
economic self-sufficiency.230

CONCLUSIONS
The preceding chapter sought to evaluate the NGO sector promoting economic
development among Palestinian in Lebanon to serve as a foundation to discuss a
particular project in the next chapter. This section aimed to analyze the key advantages of
and barriers to NGO projects targeting Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and to analyze
how these environments impact NGO strategies. I attempted to paint a complete picture
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of the history and current Lebanese policy vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees, and how the
dearth of services and opportunities to enter the labor market, create space for NGO
intervention. This sections served as the groundwork for the following case study in order
to assess how NGOs promote economic development in practice.
Based upon the overview I laid out in this chapter, I argue that the NGO sector in
Lebanon is not capable of filling the gaps in UNRWA and PLO services. This parallels
William Fisher’s claim that NGOs may not be capable of reaching the unrealistic
expectations the international community is placing upon them.231 While it is clear that
the UNRWA should not and cannot be the sole service provider for Palestinian refugees,
the NGO sector is also not capable of filling these gaps in development. As Mohan &
Stokke stress throughout their work, NGOs are victims of context and are affected by the
social, economic, and political forces surrounding them at the local, national, and
international levels. 232 Working with Palestinian refugees within Lebanon poses legal,
geographic, social, and economic barriers that make long-term successes extremely
difficult to achieve.
The NGO sector within Lebanon does possess distinct advantages in reaching the
most vulnerable in society and targeting those which existing services do not.233 The
Lebanese state largely views this intervention as relieving the “burden” of Palestinian
refugees and therefore to not pose direct barriers to NGO projects so long as they do not
seek radical change. This nature of agreement between the state and the NGO sector,
donor pressure—particularly “difficult funding” accompanied with a higher degree of
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 443.
Mohan & Stokke, “Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of
Localism,” 249.
233
Zaidi, “NGO Failure and the Need to Bring Back the State,” 262.
231
232

55

conditionality—results in intervention which is less radical by nature and which fails to
address the root causes of underdevelopment among Palestinian refugees.
At the start of this chapter, I detailed the restrictive Lebanese policies regarding
Palestinian refugees and the Lebanese economy. I particularly addressed the general trend
that Palestinians tend to work within the informal economy, as their Lebanese labor
legislation largely excludes them from participation within the formal economy.
Therefore, NGO intervention which is truly seeking to promote economic development
among Palestinian refugees within Lebanon will need to address the restrictive labor
policies hindering the economic participation of Palestinian refugees. At the same time,
promoting radical action—seeking to change Lebanese policy—could threaten NGO
funding. The result is that the NGO sector within Lebanon is largely promoting
development initiatives that promote economic independence to a point but are not going
to change the status of Palestinian refugees in the long run.
The next chapter will test these claims through a detailed case study of an NGO
seeking to promote economic development among one of the most vulnerable groups of
Palestinian refugees: women.
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CHAPTER 5:

CASE STUDY: CIVES MUNDI AND TATREEZ
AN EXPERIENCE PROMOTING ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AMONG
PALESTINIAN REFUGEE WOMEN

The following case study will narrow my general overview of the NGO sector
working with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and focus on NGO intervention targeting
women—one of the most economically vulnerable groups among Palestinian refugees.
While NGOs promoting ‘alternative development’ and ‘alternatives to development’
differ widely in their strategies and objectives, both stress that NGOs hold an advantage
when working with the most vulnerable, hard to reach populations—those typically
excluded from traditional economic development who lack access to the labor market
and/or basic services. This next chapter seeks to evaluate the strategies, advantages, and
challenges to NGO work targeting the most vulnerable Palestinian women living within
refuge camps in Lebanon. This section will consist primarily of a case study analyzing
the international development NGO Cives Mundi and their most recent initiative in
Lebanon—Tatreez—which aims to promote economic development among Palestinian
women living within three refugee camps. This study aims to investigate the strategies
and rationale behind the development intervention of this particular organization, and
how their surrounding environment of intervention impacts their approaches and
practices.
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NGOS & ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AMONG PALESTINIAN WOMEN:
PALESTINIAN WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT
Palestinian refugee women living in Lebanon face a combination of refugee,
gender, and socio-economic discrimination.234 While the entire Palestinian refugee
population faces restrictive discrimination in terms of economic development, women are
subject to multidimensional barriers to economic participation and independence,
resulting in a higher degree of dependence on family members, UNRWA, and NGO
aid.235 According to a UNWRA survey completed in 2011, only 13% of Palestinian
women refugees were working as opposed to 67% of Palestinian men.236 This is partially
a result of traditional gender roles, where women are encouraged to work within the
home, as well as the unsafe economic conditions within the refugee camps, which keep
many women home full time.237
Women who do work are typically employed in education, health, or craftwork,
or may work with civil society or international organizations as technicians or sales and
service workers.238 These women are paid less than their male counterparts—on average,
women earn approximately 3/4 of men’s income. 239 These low wage rates leave 90% of
working Palestinian women below the minimum wage (around 100 USD/month) and
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partially or fully dependent upon family members or the aid structure within the
camps.240 In addition to insufficient pay, these women are also vulnerable to violence and
discrimination in the workplace, as many of them find employment in the unregulated,
informal economy.241 Though they are earning income, the International Labour Office
suggests that women in the informal economy face:
“a precarious employment status, low, irregular or no remuneration, little or no
access to social security or protection, and limited ability to organize to ensure the
enforcement of international labour standards and human rights.”242
This economic status places heightened barriers on the economic development of
Palestinian refugee women which creates space and need for NGO intervention.

NGOS AND WOMEN’S ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
This study defines “economic development” as:
“activities that expand capacities to realize the potential of individuals, firms or
communities who contribute to the advancement of society through the
responsible production of goods and services.”243
According to Amartya Sen, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, economic development
promotes economic participation and social mobility among individuals to allow them to
“engage, contribute, and benefit from the economy.”244 These initiatives commonly
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utilize empowerment and participation strategies in order to involve people in
formulating their own development strategies and policies.245
Gita Sen argues that the “face of poverty is disproportionally female,” and that
women tend to be “disempowered in terms of their control over external resources.246
Women are at the bottom of the labor market, and are often completely excluded from
mainstream economic development. So even when they do make significant economic
contributions, they are “undervalued and unrecognized.”247 As I discuss previously,
Palestinian refugee women in Lebanon face multidimensional barriers due to both their
refugee and gender status, leaving them with limited access to entry into the labor market
and dependent upon insufficient services.248 So when considering women’s economic
development among Palestinian refugees, participation and empowerment which stress
both the control over extrinsic recourses as well as greater decision-making autonomy is
imperative to achieving long-term economic development.249
NGOs—valued for their innovative, flexible intervention—are well-placed to
promote these empowerment objectives. Within Lebanon, NGOs hold advantages in
working directly with Palestinian women, and literature suggests that NGO interventions
have a positive impact on their economic empowerment. 250 While measuring the degree
of this impact is difficult, studies show that through: socio-economic programs and
vocational training, NGOs can have a “moderate” impact on the “empowerment and
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development” of the women beneficiaries.”251 Within Lebanon, NGO empowerment
initiatives have implemented tailored programs for livelihood and direct financial
assistance of Palestinian women, set quotas for the participation of women in all relevant
programs, revised education, work, and female empowerment training or awareness
raising material to make it more relevant to the local culture, and implemented advocacy
efforts in order to correct discriminatory practices and ensure protection of women’s
rights.252

CASE STUDY: CIVES MUNDI IN LEBANON
In order to analyze these claims in practice, the following case study will discuss
the development NGO Cives Mundi’s and their most recent development initiative in
Lebanon, Tatreez, which aims to economically empower Palestinian refugee women in
Lebanon to become active in the labor force, gain equal control of economic resources,
and achieve economic self-sufficiency to decrease their dependence on UNRWA and
NGO aid. Evaluating this particular development project will serve as a way to assess
how NGO strategies of this nature play out in practice within Lebanon, and what
advantages and/or challenges accompany their intervention. The study will combine
holistic case study methodology and an embedded case study design to paint an overall
organizational picture.253 Ultimately, this study will allow me to investigate how the
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development frameworks and practical claims I find throughout my literature review play
out within particular contexts of intervention.

CIVES MUNDI: ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND & STRATEGIES
Cives Mundi—a northern development NGO headquartered in Soria, Spain—is
prime example of an NGO promoting this nature of development intervention. Their
work includes projects in 16 different countries within Latin America, Maghreb, the
Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Since their establishment in 1987, Cives
Mundi has conducted more than 100 actions for international cooperation in sectors such
as: food security, environmental protection, basic humanitarian assistance, economic
development, and the defense of the human rights of the most vulnerable populations.254
Through their aid projects, Cives Mundi promotes “cooperation and solidarity through
participation and empowerment strategies in order to achieve long-term development in
their areas of intervention.”255
Cives Mundi recognizes diverse needs within different areas and among different
groups of people, and therefore employs a different strategy in Lebanon than in other
countries of intervention.256 Within Lebanon, Cives Mundi focuses more on economic
recuperation and less on emergency aid. Their intervention utilizes empowerment
initiatives at different levels—most recently the economic independence of women—who
they see as being one of the most vulnerable groups among the Palestinian refugee
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population.257 Cives Mundi’s current director states that “the role of NGOs in Lebanon is
to work with the most marginalized and excluded portions of the population, and in
sectors where the Lebanese state does not. This makes [NGOs] fundamental actors
promoting gender equality, conflict resolution and peace” among Palestinian refugee
communities.258
In terms of Gender, Cives Mundi takes a basic human rights approach—as their
initiatives aim to promote the civil, cultural, political and social rights of women.259
Within Lebanon, Cives Mundi combines strategies from their “gender and development”
sector with their economic development strategies in order to promote the economic
participation and empowerment of Palestinian refugee women.260 Within their Strategy
for Gender and Development, Cives Mundi recognizes that gender inequalities pose
economic barriers to women in terms of: access, management, and control of economic
resources which hinder their development.261 Throughout their reports, Cives Mundi
stresses their belief in “people-centered development, where gender equality is a nonnegotiable requirement for justice, equity, and efficiency,” and their idea that economic
empowerment is an effective mechanism to overcome inequality of this nature.262
The primary role of Cives Mundi is to serve as an intermediary between
international donors and local NGOs in Lebanon. While Cives Mundi does have expats in
the field who monitor and are involved in projects, local NGOs play a huge role in the the
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actual implementation of development projects.263 In this way, Cives Mundi acts as a link
to funding that aims to help local NGOs who do not have the resources to implement
these projects on their own.264 The following case study will analyze Cives Mundi’s most
recent development project in Lebanon which utilizes this partnership strategy to promote
economic development among Palestinian women living within refugee camps in
Lebanon.

TATREEZ: “EMBROIDERING FOR A BETTER FUTURE”
In 2012, Cives Mundi launched the development project Tatreez within three of the
largest refugee camps in Lebanon (Rashidieh, Ein El Helwe and Beddawi).265 This
project aims to promote socio-economic empowerment of Palestinian refugees in
Lebanon by enhancing the “equal access and control of economic resources among
Palestinian refugee women” through the formation of a weaving co-op.266 Cives Mundi’s
strategy is to address the economic dependence of Palestinian refugee women by
providing training in traditional Palestinian embroidery (Tatreez), marketing techniques,
and developing an operating business co-op with an online shop to support the economic
participation of women within camp economies.267
Funded by the EU, Cives Mundi implemented Tatreez in collaboration with the
Lebanese Association Najdeh, AMIDEAST, ANAT—a Syrian organization that focused
on the technical aspects of the product, Fundesarte—a Spanish organization that focused
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on product design and marketing, and the GUPW—the General Union of Palestinian
Women—which focused on enhancing the capabilities and engagement of Palestinian
women in political and public life.268
Tatreez specifically targeted 120 divorced and widowed Palestinian women—
groups they view as being the most vulnerable among an already disadvantaged group. 269
In addition to increasing the income of these women, Tatreez also stresses the importance
of control and management of income.270 According to Cives Mundi’s project director for
the Middle East, Ana Gómez, the objective of Tatreez is to promote economic selfsufficiency among refugee groups to decrease their dependency on the aid structure in
Lebanon in order to free up resources to allow for national economic recuperation.271
Essentially, Cives Mundi aims to create a system in which women were adding to the
economic growth of the camps while also improving the quality of life for themselves
and their families.272

Table 5.1: TATREEZ PROJECT SUMMARY
Actions:
1.

2.

6 month training program on
traditional Palestinian
embroidery (Tatreez) for 120
Palestinian craftswomen and
15 trainers.273
Training programs for 120
Palestinian craftswomen in

Description:
Three experts from Syria and Spain provided 8
workshops on design creation and embroidery
techniques.274
Courses in: marketing strategies, optimization of
available resources, production processes, and product
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3.

4.

5.

designing and marketing of
Tatreez products.275
Entrepreneurship and
employability courses for
120 Palestinian women.277

line selection.276

The creation of a cooperative of Palestinian
refugee women with three
headquarters, one in each
camp (Rashidie, Ein El
Helwe and Beddawi).280

The legal registration and creation of a co-operative.281

The formation of a steering
committee to advise on the
marketing strategies, creative
design, and business plans.

Composed of 4 NGOs working with the implementation
of Tatreez, 3 representatives from each camp, and 2
Tatreez designers. 285

Courses outlining how to start a business within
Palestinian camps utilizing acquired skills. 278
Training in management.279

The development of sales plans and a uniform collection
within the 3 co-operative locations.282
The instalment of equipment and lighting within the 3
common spaces.283

284

ANALYSIS: NGO ADVANTAGES & CHALLENGES
ADVANTAGES:
RELATIONSHIPS WITH BENEFICIARIES
Because Tatreez utilizes empowerment and participation strategies to promote the
economic dependence of Palestinian refugee women, forming positive relationships with
the project beneficiaries is extremely important. Throughout their reports and narratives,
Cives Mundi stresses the importance of the beneficiaries playing an active role
throughout the project and developing the ability to make decisions independent from
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Cives Mundi and their local partners.286 In order to achieve this objective, Cives Mundi
stresses the importance of maintaining direct contact with beneficiaries so that there is
always an open dialogue.287 This is not extremely common for NNGOs in an
intermediary position. Many NGOs which act as links to funding have little to no direct
relations with beneficiaries and correspond with their partner organizations. By having an
expat on the ground and ensuring that they have a direct presence in the areas of
intervention, Cives Mundi is able to build up a degree of trust with the beneficiaries of the
project.

PARTICIPATION AND EMPOWERMENT
The ability of Cives Mundi to form direct relationships with beneficiaries makes
their empowerment and participation strategies more effective. Cives Mundi’s
development strategies emphasize involving these women as “empowered subjects” as
opposed to “passive recipients,” which is all too common when it comes to international
aid.288 By treating these women as active participants in all aspects of the project, the
beneficiaries are able to develop a deeper understanding of the objective of the project
and the role they play in its development.
Throughout the project, Cives Mundi reports that these women are achieving
incredible growth and that they continue to want to work.289 At the start of the project,
Cives Mundi’s project director stated that the women did not understand the nature of the
training, particularly why they were developing skills in marketing and management. But
286
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later, when they started to produce clothing and began going to stores to sell, they
developed a more complete understanding of what they were doing and showed an
extraordinary commitment to the training courses. In their narrative reports, Cives Mundi
writes that the women constantly ask for supplementary trainings.290
By the end of the project, 100% of the administrative and management decisions
within the co-ops were being made by Palestinian refugee women. 291 Because Tatreez
involved beneficiaries in all aspects of the project, the likelihood that the co-op will be
sustainable is more likely. Sumaia Siddek, an embroidery trainer now working in all three
refugee camps, described a “fund for continuity” that the women created on their own.
This fund, which each women adds to from their excess profits, will be used to keep the
co-op running after funding form the project is complete.292 In my interview with her,
Ana Gómez shared with me that this was not part of the project, it was developed by the
women themselves.293

SOCIAL CAPITAL
The coordination among these women would not have been possible without the
development of a social network through Tatreez. Especially considering that Tatreez
targeted divorced/widowed women, the project was dealing with groups limited in the
kinds of relations they can have. In general, lack of social capital, specifically the access
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to information and influence through social networks, decreases opportunities for
economic participation.294
In their study From Exclusion to Empowerment: Divorced and Widowed Women
in Palestinian Refugee Camps—which they conducted on behalf of Cives Mundi—Tatwir
Center for Policy Studies claims that divorced/widowed women have a triple
disadvantage in regards to social capital:
“as Palestinian refugees they are restricted to camps and discriminated against by
Lebanese; as women, their social interaction is limited for cultural reasons;
finally, as ‘socially exceptional’ cases, they may be shunned by society and
hidden from the public eye.”295
Within the same study, Tatwir found that the majority of these women relied on
family networks to find employment.296 While this can be a beneficial source of social
capital, it can be problematic when local communities disapprove of women in the
workforce.297
Tatreez provides a larger social capital network by connecting women throughout
each refugee camps, and also promoting collaboration between the three camps. Within
their report detailing the outcomes of Tatreez business training, the local partner
organization AMIDEAST discussed how the increased collaboration between the women
beneficiaries—both the weavers and the trainers—was bringing about positive changes to
their methods of work. They report that the women began to work collectively, despite
belonging to different organizations and that the sessions were interactive and
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emphasized group communication and participation.298 The success of this ‘collective
entrepreneurship” is largely a result of the availability of a common space for working
and forming connections with other beneficiaries. Having daily contact with each other
improved their team work, knowledge exchange, and organizational skills.299

PARTNERSHIP
As Cives Mundi’s primary role is to serve as an intermediary between
international donors and local partners in Lebanon, effective partnership is imperative to
the implementation of Cives Mundi’s projects. In an interview, Cives Mundi’s managing
director, Joaquín Alcalde states that “Cives Mundi is an organization that seeks to
empower local NGOs.”300 Ana Gómez—Cives Mundi’s Project Director for the Middle
East, agrees with Alcalde by saying that these local NGOs are in a learning process and
that Cives Mundi can add expertise and objectivity to their projects. She states that these
local NGOs are often not prepared to implement these projects on their own, especially
considering that they lack access to funding.301
At the same time, Ana Gómez—Cives Mundi’s Project Director for the Middle
East, stresses that local NGOs know the beneficiaries and what will work in different
contexts.302 So in order for partnership of this nature to be effective, both parties must
utilize the strengths of the other. Alcalde went on to say that Tatreez has been an example
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of good coordination and institutional collaboration, especially taking into account the
complications that accompany development within refugee camps.303

RELATIONSHIPS WITH LOCAL MUNICIPALITIES
I stress within my secondary analysis of the NGO sector in Lebanon that the
relationship NGOs develop with the local authorities within the camps is extremely
important, as the central government is largely absent within the camps. Cives Mundi’s
narrative reports reveal that their relationship with the local authorities in the three camps
is very positive. They meet on a quarterly basis with the Popular Committees from the
three camps, all of which offered their support to the project. These positive relations
allow Cives Mundi to access refugee communities without increased barriers. Gómez
states that many of these areas are run by militias or religious factions and NGOs have to
talk with them and let them know the nature of their projects so that they can help and do
not pose additional challenges.304 Within the context of Tatreez, Gómez states that Cives
Mundi’s local partners serve as a connection to local authorities as well as beneficiaries.
At the same time, even though the local authorities fully support Tatreez, they lack the
capacity to provide additional financial support to the project.305

CHALLENGES:
CHANGING CONTEXTS
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NGOs are victims of context; so while Cives Mundi possesses distinct advantages
in terms of forming close, mutually-beneficial partnerships and the local level, they exist
within a larger national and international system which is constantly changing.306 When
Cives Mundi began working in Lebanon, they solely worked with refugees within the
camps.307 However, as need continues to grow and there are more problems, the strategy
has become more open to change. One of the most impactful changes to impact the
implementation of Tatreez has been the escalation of the Syria crisis.

Table 5.2: IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CRISIS ON NGO INTERVENTION
TARGETED TOWARDS PALESTINIAN REFUGEES
The influx of more than 1.3 million Syrian and PRS (Palestinian refugees from Syria) into
Lebanon from 2011 to 2015.308
- The refugee population grows to comprise more than 25% of the entire population within
Lebanon.309
- As early as 2013 (just as the refugee population was reaching 1 million) The International
Crisis Group released a report stating that the Lebanese state “does not possess adequate
resources to address refugee needs.”310
The diversion of funds from Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRL) to Syrian refugees and
Palestinian Refugees from Syria
- The crisis in Syria begins to “dominate” the international aid causing NGOs to redirect
funding formerly earmarked for PRL to refugees from Syria. 311
- NGOs are funding projects specifically aimed towards PRS which leaves less funding for
PRL (Palestinian refugees from Lebanon).
Shortage of UNRWA and NGO resources
- The UNRWA is still providing the same services to Palestinians as before the conflict, but
these services now have to meet the needs of a growing refugee population.
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Worsening economic conditions
- Camps become increasingly overcrowded, prices and house rents rise in the poorest areas
and wages are pushed down because of the fierce competition for the jobs available. 312
Deteriorating Security Situation
- Heightened security measures and restrictions to movement make NGO intervention and
coordination increasingly difficult.313

At the time when Cives Mundi drafted Tatreez, the crisis in Syria was not an
immediate concern within Lebanon, and therefore was not taken into consideration. As
the crisis escalated and over a million refugees fled to Lebanon, the situation within
Palestinian refugee camps changed drastically.314 As I outline in the above table, a key
impact of the Syria crisis on Palestinian refugees is the reorientation of international
development funds towards Syrian refugees. This places increasing pressure on local
Palestinian NGOs, but simultaneously cuts down their capacities and funding.315 As the
resources of their local partners severely diminished, Cives Mundi reacted by adding 2
additional Palestinian NGOs to the project—the Women Programming Center and
NAVTSS—which provided the training venues as well as a permanent locations for the
co-ops.316

SECURITY AND MOVEMENT
While Cives Mundi was able to adapt and re-strategize in some ways, the
deteriorating security situation within the camps posed unavoidable issues with project

312

Ibid., 29.
See note 304.
314
Cives Mundi, Interim Narrative Report - Tatreez, (Beirut, Lebanon, August 2014): 16.
315
Ibid.
316
Ibid.
313

73

implementation. Within their narrative reports, Cives Mundi consistently identifies
security issues as a core obstacle to their activities.317
The security situation within the camps posed significant barriers in terms of
selecting beneficiaries to participate in Tatreez—as the selection of widowed/divorced
research required extensive needs assessments and primary data collection—as well as
the selection of locations for training.318 In an attempt to keep on track with the project
timeline, Cives Mundi hired an employee from their partner organization Najdeh to
follow up on logistic and operational issues and decided to change locations for
training.319 While the original proposal planned to hold training outside the camps, the
deteriorating security situation forced Cives Mundi to re-strategize by finding locations
within the camps.320 They also increased the training locations from 3 to 6 (2 in each
camp) so that the beneficiaries would not have to make long trips and would be less
likely to encounter road blocks.321 For the women still unable to make it to the co-op,
Tatreez allowed them to work from home and bring their products to the co-op when they
could.322
Cives Mundi also stated that they were trying to mitigate these security challenges
by meeting consistently with security platforms within the camps as well as the Spanish
embassy, but still had to postpone project activities which required foreigners to enter
into the camps.323 So while Cives Mundi was able to adapt and re-strategize to a degree,
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their intervention was still heavily impacted by the deterioration of the areas surrounding
their intervention.

COORDINATION AMONG STAKEHOLDERS
Cives Mundi displays strong advantages in forming partnerships through Tatreez,
but collaborating with multiple organizations also brought about challenges. As Tatreez is
a historical Palestinian tradition, there were disagreements among partners regarding the
“cultural legacy” of Tatreez. Cives Mundi reports that these differing viewpoints made it
difficult to get the network of associations together.324 There were also issues with local
partners who felt that the Tatreez co-operative would taking away their workers.325 After
several months of refusing to meet with the other partners and to provide a list of
potential beneficiaries, Cives Mundi had to proceed with the partner organizations that
were committed to the project and include the beneficiaries provided by these NGOs.326
However, even among these beneficiaries, some of the trainees with their own Tatreez
shops began to contract the best students to form their own staff.327 From this, Cives
Mundi discovered the importance of the separation of NGO service provision with direct
employment.328 Especially considering that local NGOs take a leading role in project
implementation, assuring that partners’ interests do not conflict with the objectives of the
project is imperative.
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RELATIONS WITH THE LEBANESE STATE
As I outline throughout this thesis, the relationship an NGO develops with the
state is incredibly important, as the NGO must exist within the national policy
environment. Within my secondary analysis, I discuss that NGO cooperation with the
Lebanese state is one of coexistence, but generally not active collaboration.329 I also
argue that NGOs promoting economic development among Palestinian refugees who do
not actively challenge state operations will not experience interference from the Lebanese
government. At the same time, I claim that the hands-off approach of the Lebanese
government is a barrier of its own. Tatreez is a prime example of development
intervention which received little opposition from the central government, but where state
inaction severely hindered the efficiency and effectiveness of the project.
In an in-depth interview, Gómez identifies the Lebanese government as an
important stakeholder in terms of working with Palestinian refugees, as there are barriers
in terms of their right to work.330 However, she goes on to say that even though they are
an important stakeholder, they do not actively participate.331 She states that they create
legal obstructions, but that it is inaccessible for NGOs to enter into national politics
because their projects will not get funded.332
Within the context of Tatreez, Gómez outlines that the government did not
interfere with the project because it sought to empower Palestinian refugees without
seeking to change the existing political system. She states that:
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“we are implementing projects within the refugee camps for Palestinians who will
continue living there. The Lebanese government is not going to give us money to
do it, but they are also not going to interfere.”333
Their rationale behind this, she claims, is that the Lebanese government views the
project as benefiting Lebanese institutions. If these women increase their income, they
will be less dependent on aid and eventually—if the project continues to grow—buy
material from Lebanese businesses and improve the Lebanese economy.334 Still, while
the state may not pose any direct barriers to Tatreez, the legal issues accompanying the
status of Palestinian refugees did pose significant barriers to the implementation of the
project.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL BARRIERS
Gómez states that in the case of economic independence, the sociocultural context
poses challenges to Tatreez. She says that working with women posed barriers culturally,
but also that working with Palestinians puts them at a huge disadvantage in terms of
empowerment.335
For example, one of the actions of Tatreez was to form a legally registered co-op,
but the administrative and legal barriers made it impossible. First, the bans on Palestinian
labor and association restrict Tatreez beneficiaries from managing formal businesses.
Second, the camps are not considered to be Lebanese soil, but rather under UN
jurisdiction, making it impossible to form shops legally registered under Lebanese law.336
Therefore, the Tatreez co-op is always going to be art of the informal economy because it
333
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“cannot be any other way.”337 This is especially problematic in terms of the development
of the online shop. As of now, the Tatreez online shop is running without an account
number associated with a business. This essentially means that the shop has to export
their products as individuals and cannot complete transactions online. Instead, customers
have to call the number on the website, ask for what they want, and Tatreez sends it.338
While this system is functioning right now, it will become increasingly problematic if
Tatreez continues to grow.339
Gómez states that Cives Mundi hired a lawyer to provide legal alternatives to a
formal co-operative and to asses its yearly costs in order to evaluate the best option for
the beneficiaries and for the NGOs committed to the project. Cives Mundi is also
considering replacing the co-operative with an existing association of Tatreez embroidery
so they do not have to register a new organization.340 Even with these possible
alternatives, Gómez states that Tatreez will most likely remain part of the informal
economy. 341

DONOR PRESSURE
As I address when I discuss Cives Mundi’s relations to the Lebanese state, Tatreez
does not seek to bring about political change. While Cives Mundi’s choice of strategies
have a variety of contributing factors, Gómez claims that the apolitical nature of their
intervention is largely donor driven. She asserts that if a project presents a political
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component, it will not get funded.342 Because Tatreez is funded by the EU, the project
cannot include critique of the Lebanese government, as the EU fears that placing pressure
on the Lebanese state could spark conflict and harm international relations.343
As Cives Mundi’s primary role is to serve as a link to foreign aid dollars, they
must present proposals capable of competing for funding. While Cives Mundi does have
an advantage in that they have a strong team in their headquarter office as well as on the
ground in Lebanon, the calls for proposals are becoming increasingly competitive as
funds are reduced and reoriented towards Syrian refugees.344 In order to receive funding,
Cives Mundi recognizes the importance of presenting a project that properly embodies the
brand of the donor.345 As their primary donor is the EU—which must consider the
importance of maintaining positive state relations—Tatreez cannot seek to restructure the
political system hindering economic development among Palestinian refugee women.

ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
The ultimate goal of Tatreez is to the promote the economic development of
Palestinian women in order to increase their economic self-sufficiency and to decrease
their dependence on the aid structure.346 Despite the success of Tatreez in meeting its
outlined objectives, Gómez admits that without an opportunity to restructure the system,
these women are always going to need help.347 Even though these women are generating
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income independently (which is the primary objective of the project), as Palestinians in
Lebanon, they are going to remain part of the informal economy.348
Cives Mundi recognizes these limitations as early as the proposal drafting stage of
the project. Within the Tatreez proposal, Cives Mundi writes that they do not have the
authority to intervene directly in the political situation and improve the Lebanese legal
system currently excluding Palestinian refugees.349 They do, however, focus on there
leverage in producing economic change. They strategically include the GUPW as a
partner organization.350 While including the GUPW was a strategic step towards
supporting political change, the goal of empowering the GUPW to pressure for
amendments to the legal system without getting directly involved, made the odds of
bringing about policy change incredibly slim.351 Within their Good Practices Guide,
Cives Mundi stresses that the challenges facing divorced and widowed Palestinian
refugee women are “multi-faceted” and are a result of the “political, economic, and legal
structures that govern the refugee camps.”352 They urge that complexity of these
challenges will require “multi-stakeholder, action-based alliances that will allow for
exchange of information and experience, referrals, and the formation and implementation
of integrated solutions.”353 However, Tatreez includes no actions which directly seek to
restructure these systems.
In their report From Exclusion to Empowerment: Divorced and Widowed Women
in Palestinian Refugee Camps, Tatwir Center for Policy Studies writes that the exclusion
348
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of Palestinian women is “not just about poverty and exclusion from economic
participation, but is a structural problem,” largely the policy barriers hindering their entry
into the labor market.354 These barriers force these women to remain part of the informal
economy, which is precisely what occurred with Tatreez.355 While these women are
generating their own income and are more economically self-sufficient, Tatreez was only
able to promote economic development among these women to a point.
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CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS & ANALYSIS OF RESULTS IN CONTEXT

DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS
Within the context of existing development frameworks, NGOs serve either to
offer a development system separate from mainstream development—supported by the
‘alternatives to development’ framework, or to fill the gaps in development—supported
by the ‘alternative development’ framework, and with it ‘neoliberal development policy’
and the ‘New Policy Agenda.” I argue that Cives Mundi utilizes the latter, more
specifically the ‘New Policy Agenda,’ which combines ‘alternative development’ with
‘neoliberal development policy.”
Table 6.1 NGOS WORKING WITH PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN
LEBANON IN THE CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORKS
‘New Policy Agenda’
(‘Alternative Development’ &
‘Neoliberal Development’)
NGO role in economic Fill the development gaps in
UNRWA and PLO services and the
development
informal market
To promote economic
Objectives
independence among Palestinian
refugees to lessen the “burden” on
the aid structure

Alternatives to
Development

To promote the economic rights
of PRL
To promote the economic
inclusion of Palestinian refugees
within Lebanon’s formal
economy

Strategies

Participation and empowerment
Advocacy for policy change;
within the existing power structure radical participation and
empowerment

Relations with the
state

Cooperative with the state and
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Seek to reform Lebanese policy
vis-à-vis Palestinian refugees

As I outline in the literature review, the 'alternative development' framework
asserts that NGOs should fill gaps between the market and the state—or in this case the
gaps in UNRWA and PLO services and the informal economy—by pursuing objectives
the government has previously ignored or is unable to fill.356 While this framework may
function within a context where the state is active in service provision or development
initiatives, the Lebanese state is almost completely absent when it comes to Palestinian
refugees. Therefore, NGOs pursuing ‘alternative development’ through their intervention
targeted towards Palestinian refugees are not filling the gaps in state services, but rather
the services of the UNRWA, the PLO, and other NGOs. As I point out in my secondary
study, this is problematic both in terms of NGO capacity—NGOs may not be able to fill
these extremely wide development gaps—and coordination—the NGO sector struggles to
effectively coordinate their development intervention.357
Within ‘alternative development,’ ‘neoliberal development policy,’ goes further to
as to suggest that NGOs should utilize market-based solutions to solve development
issues. Again, this is problematic when applied to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, as
they are largely excluded from the labor market. So even though Tatreez included
neoliberal strategies—specifically the transfer of training and skills to help Palestinian
women compete in the international market—the beneficiaries of the project are still
excluded from the formal economy.
The ‘New Policy Agenda’ combines ‘alternative development’ with ‘neoliberal
development policy’ by dually targeting economic markets—“achieving economic
356
Fisher, “Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices,” 444; Hedayat
Allah Nikkhah & Ma’rof Bin Redzuan. “The Role of NGOs in Promoting Empowerment for
Sustainable Community Development.” Journal of Human Ecology 30, no. 2 (2010): 85.
357
Ajial Center, “Palestinian Non-Government Organizations in Lebanon.”

83

growth, producing goods, and providing services for the poor,” while also promoting
“good governance.”358 This is the development framework which I argue Cives Mundi
promotes. This development framework places NGOs as the safety nets which fill the
void where the state and market is unable or unwilling to do so.359 Theoretically, NGOs
complement government strategies; however, in the context of Tatreez, NGOs simply
seek to coexist with the Lebanese state.360 So while the ‘New Policy Agenda’ suggests
that NGO intervention should create domestic demand for goods and services, improve
productivity, and mobilize the community and the market, these objectives are largely
pursued within the informal economy.361
In the case of Tatreez, the macro-objective of of the project was to promote
economic development within Palestinian refugee camps in order to decrease their
dependence on the aid structure and to decrease the “burden” on Lebanese
infrastructure.362 I identify the potential problems of this strategy to align with the
argument of Stephen Commins: that NGOs risk “cloaking government inaction,” or
simply that NGOs may lack the capacity to fill development gaps.363 When evaluating
Tatreez, I would say Cives Mundi suffered from both. In fact, it was largely the inaction
of the Lebanese state—including the issues accompanying their slow administrative
processes and refusal to waver in allowing the legal formation of the Tatreez cooperative—which posed a barrier to Cives Mundi’s intervention. At the same time, Cives
Mundi lacks the capacity and the authority to bring about true change to Lebanese policy.
358
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Not only that, but in doing so, they would risk losing the funding to complete the project
in the first place.
Edwards & Hulme, who largely base their work on practical experience, claim
that the fragmentation of the NGO sector, NGO dependence on outside funding, and their
vulnerability to changing contexts, all hinder the sustainability of their intervention.364
These are precisely the challenges which I discovered throughout my secondary study of
the NGO sector within Lebanon, as well as my case study of Cives Mundi and Tatreez.
They go further to claim that in countries where the gaps in development are
exceptionally wide—whether that be through state inaction or inability to intervene—
traditional development actors may become increasingly dependent upon the NGO sector
and become even less active in development promotion.365 This has been the case within
Lebanon since the establishment of the UNRWA.
Critics of these development frameworks claim that economic development
within certain countries and among certain groups will “require a structural
transformation of economic and political relations.”366 Therefore, instead of filling the
gap between the market and the state, NGOs should serve as “vehicles for progressive
change.”367 While this framework appears to account for all of the weaknesses of the
‘New Policy Agenda,’ it raises the question of whether or not NGOs possess the capacity
to bring about effective policy change within Lebanon. When considering the case of
Tatreez and Cives Mundi, I would say that they do not. Cives Mundi is simply too small
of an organization and lacks the resources to serve as drivers for progressive change. It is
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365
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for this reason that Cives Mundi—and other organizations like it—aim to work where
they have the advantage. As I identify at the start of the chapter, this advantage is
working with the most vulnerable populations who are excluded from traditional
economic development by serving as a funding intermediary.368 Therefore, if the only
way for NGOs to utilize their advantages successfully is to write a project they know will
get funded and to coexist with the national government, then it is in their best interest to
do so. The takeaway, though, is that the international community needs to be aware that
these projects will be less radical in nature, as these NGOs will adapt accordingly to state
and donor pressure. In practice, these conclusions should not undermine the value of
current NGO interventions, but seek to inform development actors that the NGO sector
might not be well-placed to target development issues at their source—particularly when
they require a policy change. It is because of these disadvantages—primarily
susceptibility to donor pressure, national governments, and geographic context—that I
argue NGOs may not be able to fill the roles development frameworks suggest they can.

CONCLUSIONS
At the start of this thesis, I choose to define economic development as:
“activities that expand capacities to realize the potential of individuals, firms or
communities who contribute to the advancement of society through the
responsible production of goods and services.”369
While I do not mean to communicate that one is not possible without the other, I do argue
that sustainable, effective economic development initiatives will need to promote
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individual economic development within the formal economy. This particular definition
of economic development stresses that the economic development of individuals, firms,
and communities is directly connected to the economic development of society—which is
not possible when a community is almost entirely excluded from mainstream economic
development. Despite the fact that Tatreez successfully increased the economic
independence of these Palestinian refugee women, the project did little in the way of
changing the policies restricting the economic participation of Palestinian refugees within
Lebanon.
This nature of intervention is not only limited in terms of its ability to promote
economic development at the individual level, but also in terms of lifting the refugee
“burden” off of the aid structure. Even though the beneficiaries of this project achieved a
degree of economic independence, the contexts in which their development is
occurring—the geographical limitations within the camps as well as the restrictive policy
environment within Lebanon—will prevent them from achieving complete selfsufficiency free from outside aid.
This being said, Cives Mundi does possess distinct advantages in terms of
adaptability—which they display through their ability to re-strategize in response to the
crisis in Syria: the reorientation of funds, heightened security risks and restrictions to
movement, and the increasing refugee population—and their ability to form close
relationships with stakeholders—NGO partners, local municipalities, and beneficiaries.
Both of these advantages aid Cives Mundi in their ability to successfully utilize
empowerment and participation strategies within contexts which are not conducive to
female economic participation nor economic development in general.
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At the same time, the challenges facing Cives Mundi’s—primarily the lack of
involvement/cooperation of the Lebanese state and their susceptibility to donor
pressure—severely hinder their ability to address the source of underdevelopment among
Palestinian refugees—as they fear harming their established interests.
The International Labour Organization & the Committee for the Employment of
Palestinian Refugees assert that:
“the development conditions of Palestinian refugees are very much
linked to their employment status, [and that] the lack of access to fair
job opportunities and decent work is exacerbating the vicious cycle of
impoverishment and precarious conditions that Palestinians endure.”370
These findings support my conclusion in order to improve the socio-economic
rights of Palestinian refugees and to decrease their dependence on aid in the long-term,
development intervention needs to focus on gaining entry into the formal economy
through advocating for their economic rights within Lebanon. By integrating Palestinian
refugees into the Lebanese labor market, intervention of this nature will improve the
economic well-being of Palestinians as well as stability within Lebanon.371
I begin this thesis by describing the view that NGOs can serve as “magic bullets”
for solving development issues.372 Through my survey of development literature, I find
that the development community recognizes NGOs as being well-placed to reach those
excluded from mainstream economic development. Within Lebanon, NNGOs such as
Cives Mundi primarily act as funding intermediaries to connect local NGOs (SNGOs)
with foreign aid dollars. This role, though advantageous in terms of funneling aid directly
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to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, can lead to the de-politicization of NGO strategies
and prevent them from targeting underdevelopment at its source—in the case of Lebanon,
promoting radical change to Lebanon’s policy towards Palestinian refugees.
This is not to say that NGOs need to change their strategies and forgo foreign aid
dollars in order to critique the Lebanese government. In actuality that would be
counterproductive—as a key advantage of NGOs is their ability to access a variety of
funding. Instead, this thesis seeks to inform those who maintain that NGOs are the
“panacea for the ills that afflict underdeveloped countries” that NGOs may only be able
to promote economic development to a point.373 Especially when funded by political
states or IGOs, the NGO sector may not be well-placed to solve development issues
where state policy is a primary barrier to economic development among a particular
group. Achieving an international awareness that NGOs do possess distinct advantages,
but may not be a cure-all to economic underdevelopment, will allow the NGO sector to
promote development within their functional capacity without placing unreachable
expectations on their interventions.
The roles of the NGO sector are constantly redefined as contexts and objectives
continue to shift, therefore these assertions do not hold true for all NGOs.374 The
fragmentation of the NGO sector, displayed through the wide differentiation of
organizational structure, strategies, objectives, and areas of intervention, make
generalizations regarding NGO roles in development inherently problematic.
This study attempted to analyze the conventional wisdom regarding NGO roles
and to critically test general trends in the NGO sector in order to evaluate how they play
373
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out in Lebanon.375 While this study provided a better understanding of the functions of
NGOs working with Palestinian refugees within Lebanon, other studies detailing NGO
intervention in specific places at specific times will be imperative to critically test
existing development frameworks.376 I stated in my methodology that this thesis can also
serve as a preliminary or pilot to multiple case studies. Therefore, I suggest that
additional research which critically analyzes NGO intervention in particular contexts will
be imperative to evaluating current development frameworks, as well as gaining insight
into effective NGO strategies.
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